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Ask HN: Why aren't cell carriers liable for spam calls?
If I get a spam call, the originator of that call is theoretically liable - typically, some VoIP centre in India. Of course, they are impossible to track down.
Why not shift this liability to the last mile? If my carrier connects me with a spam call, they have to pay me the $500 fine per violation.
They could then have voluntary agreements with whoever they are peering with to pay the fine, sort of like how the financial system works. It would then cascade until it reaches a carrier who doesn't care, who would then be liable for the fines.
So:
1. I get a phone call. My carrier is AT&T.
2. AT&T got it from carrier C1.
3. C1 got it from carrier C2.
4. C2 got it from "VoIP Solutions Inc." of the Cayman Islands.
5. VoIP Solutions Inc. keeps poor records or whatever.
Then,
1. I ask AT&T to give me $100. They either do it immediately or lose their license.
2. AT&T asks carrier C1 to give them $100. If they don't, that's AT&T's problem, but they can depeer them.
3. C1 in turn asks C2 to pay them $100, and they too pay up (or lose their peering with C1).
4. C2 asks the Cayman corporation. They refuse.
5. C2 absorbs the loss and fire VoIP Solutions Inc as a peer.
The final link will always be a carrier with poor control over who is connecting to their network - in other words, enabling crime.
This is perfectly incentive-compatible, and it would have worked for e-mail spam too back in the day. It's quite trivial to implement. Why isn't it ever suggested?
- sarcasmatwork 7y agoWe all hate them... But this year we are getting some action. At the end of 2019, President Trump signed the TRACED Act into law allowing the Federal Communications Commission to protect consumers from robocall scammers. https://thehill.com/policy/technology/476335-trump-signs-law-to-cut-down-on-robocalls https://thehill.com/policy/technology/476335-trump-signs-law... And for something funny, check out youtuber "Kitboga". This guy pranks the scammers.
- heartbeats 7y agoThat seems like a half measure. Carriers still aren't liable for letting garbage on their network, they just have to let me block it without charging me anything for the privilege.
- mtmail 7y agoThe German equivalent https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Network_Agency https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Network_Agency has such power. They receive 200.000 complains per year (nice accessible online form) and force providers to block numbers. Also if it turns out to be fraud, e.g. you made a contract with the fraudser over the phone, then the contract is void and the company has no legal standing to demand money. If they operated a premium number (calling back costs you money) the provider has to void the amount. Pretty solid, I haven't received a spam call in 5, maybe 10 years. Of course still plenty others do, thus the 200.000 complains per year, and foreign numbers can't be blocked or tracing the calls leads nowhere. For the US it might be a great improvement.
- AdrianEGraphene 7y agoSpammers make many fiber to copper to fiber connections. Every call essentially comes from a black box and every carrier is complicit. So if you make a "last mile" fine, basically every carrier will be charged "evenly". This plan wouldn't have the incentive structure needed to change carrier behavior. This video explains it nicely . [1] [1] https://youtu.be/WOAapu-XJl8?list=LLfTvbJseqag4h_gPkk1q58g&t=82 https://youtu.be/WOAapu-XJl8?list=LLfTvbJseqag4h_gPkk1q58g&t...
- heartbeats 7y agoWell, carriers would have to block the black boxes and only allow the good networks on. AT&T can peer with Sprint or T-Mobile, but the shady carriers that lets fiber terminate into copper without asking questions have to do due diligence or get cut off. It wouldn't be evenly distributed. Your carrier could pass on the fine at least a few hops deep, until it reaches whoever connected the shady VoIP company to the real network. In the video's example, it would be Google Voice, the owner of the hacked VoIP systems' uplink provider, or the anonymous online call services. It's rare that the spammers use payphones or prepaid cards. Even if it's the same situation as with e-mail spam, this would also be a workable solution for that problem. Say I have a G-Mail account. I get spam from X@hotmail.com. Now G-Mail have to pay me the fine, and Hotmail have to pay GMail the fine, and X has to pay Hotmail the fine. Sure, they can't track down X, but Hotmail have to pay up for letting bad actors on their network. We could also generalize this to BGP, of course. I get a port 22 brute-force attempt to my server, I contact my ISP, they pay me. They contact whoever peered them, who pays, until we get to China, where some local ISP says that a PC on their network was hacked. Too bad. Either the Chinese ISP pays up, or they get depeered by their CN <-> HK ISP, or they get depeered by their uplink, and so on. Here is an example traceroute to the Chinese ecommerce site taobao.com from Cogent. In my example, the fine would travel down this list until it finds someone unwilling to pay up, who then gets depeered. traceroute to 140.205.220.96 (140.205.220.96), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets 1 gi0-1-1-19.5.agr21.jfk02.atlas.cogentco.com (66.28.3.113) 0.693 ms 0.702 ms 2 be2605.ccr41.jfk02.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.1.153) 0.741 ms 0.759 ms 3 be2806.ccr41.dca01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.40.106) 6.397 ms be2807.ccr42.dca01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.40.110) 6.538 ms 4 be2113.ccr42.atl01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.24.222) 17.340 ms be2112.ccr41.atl01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.7.158) 17.461 ms 5 be2687.ccr41.iah01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.28.70) 31.636 ms 31.606 ms 6 be2928.ccr21.elp01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.30.162) 47.240 ms be2927.ccr21.elp01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.29.222) 47.095 ms 7 be2930.ccr32.phx01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.42.77) 55.345 ms be2929.ccr31.phx01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.42.65) 55.417 ms 8 be2931.ccr41.lax01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.44.86) 66.946 ms 67.307 ms 9 be3271.ccr41.lax04.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.42.102) 67.073 ms 67.072 ms 10 38.142.238.34 (38.142.238.34) 69.608 ms 69.608 ms 11 202.97.50.29 (202.97.50.29) 73.785 ms 73.790 ms 12 202.97.71.193 (202.97.71.193) 206.204 ms 206.594 ms 13 202.97.12.193 (202.97.12.193) 200.253 ms * 14 202.97.24.249 (202.97.24.249) 206.719 ms 202.97.62.61 (202.97.62.61) 202.714 ms 15 101.95.120.105 (101.95.120.105) 224.543 ms 101.95.120.233 (101.95.120.233) 219.260 ms 16 124.74.166.18 (124.74.166.18) 222.636 ms 101.95.206.14 (101.95.206.14) 230.753 ms 17 101.95.208.10 (101.95.208.10) 233.093 ms * 18 114.80.58.82 (114.80.58.82) 237.192 ms 180.163.38.82 (180.163.38.82) 213.441 ms 19 116.251.88.134 (116.251.88.134) 204.868 ms 116.251.88.154 (116.251.88.154) 220.342 ms 20 140.205.58.9 (140.205.58.9) 213.268 ms 116.251.106.190 (116.251.106.190) 197.170 ms 21 * * 22 * * 23 * * 24 * * 25 * * 26 * * 27 * * 28 * * 29 * * 30 * *