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In my experience, the best way to eliminate the VPN is to expose your various internal business services as websites w/ TLS1.2 & multi-factor authentication. O
by bob1029 7y ago
In my experience, the best way to eliminate the VPN is to expose your various internal business services as websites w/ TLS1.2 & multi-factor authentication.
Obviously, this isn't practical for everything. But, if the thing you were using VPN for is already a web application, you are basically halfway there. Ideally, you just directly expose a secure web application to clients, but in some cases (i.e. very old legacy systems) you probably want to put an nginx box in front and then put the authentication at that level.
Web access has a huge range of benefits. Users are scoped directly to the system of concern rather than an entire network of hosts. You can take security to the next level with server-side rendering of web content in order to avoid additional required channels of communication or revealing of implementation secrets to the client (e.g. SPA client source).
We are at a point of placing our actual application servers directly on the public internet (with TLS1.2/MFA/ACLs/etc). Hiding behind VPNs or layers of reverse proxies seems to cause more harm than good.
- cameronbrown 7y ago> Obviously, this isn't practical for everything If you have the engineering resources to back it up, it definitely can be. Internal services at Google usually trust the office network the same as any other -- well documented in the BeyondCorp paper if you're interested.
- LinuxBender 7y agoMy understanding based on the folks I know at Google is that BeyondCorp paper was a PoC that was implemented in part of their corp network, that is called Production, not to be confused with the production network that hosts their search site. That network still requires a VPN and a hardened Linux laptop to access. Not every service has been modified to implement the RPC calls / authenticated protobuf code changes. Someone at Google please feel free to correct me on this.
- asdfasgasdgasdg 7y agoBeyondCorp is not just a proof of concept. Everything at Google is accessed through it, including production-production (through a proxy maybe? Not sure the details). You're right about the requirement to have a hardened device -- which acts sort of like a token (as described in the BeyondCorp whitepapers). But it can be Windows, Linux, Mac, Chromebook, Android or iPhone. I never use VPN and I work on production stuff from outside the office all the time. (FWIW, I don't think there's anything secret here. This stuff is very explicitly described in the whitepapers.)
- jedieaston 7y agoAs I understood the paper, their production version is called überproxy and has access to everything they host, as they moved their applications all on to it (notably, this means SSH now has to go through chrome).
- bluecmd 7y agoBeyondCorp is the effort/program name, ÜP is one of the software that enables it to be implemented. ÜP is just a fancy Envoy/nginx reverse proxy.
- kccqzy 7y agoWith BeyondCorp, the production network you access does host all of the critical jobs including search. But of course you only get to manipulate these jobs in an approved way, e.g. using an RPC to bring up or bring down a job. Interacting with jobs by sending them RPCs requires ACLs naturally. You don't get direct SSH access to production machines or any other lower level network access like packet sniffing on the production network.
- thedance 7y agoA key reason why BeyondCorp actually works is hardly anybody needs to SSH to prod, and people who do need it, need it rarely. Everything at Google has rich RPC control surfaces and the tools are installed on users' workstations to invoke the RPCs. Status of everything is available via HTTP, in your browser. No need to SSH to a server to read logs or restart a process. Need to collect hardware PMU counters in prod? There's an RPC service for that. Not only do these rich interfaces enable BeyondCorp, they also cut down on insider risk because it's no longer considered "normal" to get an interactive shell session in production.
- whatsmyusername 7y agoWe do this with a whitelist pattern to the building for 'sensitive' services. Setting up VPNs to AWS is prohibitively expensive if you're not going to build and manage hosts yourself. I don't have the time or patience to deal with it.
- unexaminedlife 7y agoI want this, but with a twist. 1) I want the websites to do certificate verification on the certs I'm using on my desktop. 2) Then on top of that my website should use usb security key verification as well. Easy enough to do #2, but I want #1 to be ubiquitous as well. ... So basically my HTTPS server will use my public key as my identity, not my username/email and password.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- AYBABTME 7y agoyou can do that with mutual TLS (client side authentication)
- unexaminedlife 7y agoThanks for pointing that out. I definitely get that it's possible, but as far as I know in the open source world there isn't much in terms of infrastructure to implement these types of solutions in web applications. Happy to be proven wrong, I'm just unaware if any popular open source HTTPS servers offer this as an integrated solution. Or better yet, I'd like raw access to the certificate info FROM the application layer on server-side so I can manage that as needed.
- ViViDboarder 7y agoYou don’t implement it at the Application level. You implement mutual TLS on your proxy and then each application can keep its own auth. Disclaimer: I haven’t don’t this myself (yet), but have read about it a bit.
- unexaminedlife 7y agoRight. I may have done a poor job explaining. Imagine if the HTTPS server did all its verification / etc at the protocol level, but then EXPOSED the public key, used by the client, to the application I wrote. This way I can (at the application level) do app-related stuff like reject users if (for example) they've provided a public key not in my white-listed public keys. This would also make it seamless to build tooling around the application, such as what github (and others) do when they ask you to maintain public keys you may use when pushing / pulling to/from a repo. But in this case users could provide public keys they will use when accessing the website from internet (as opposed to intranet).
- tomjen3 7y agoWhy wouldn't it be even more secure with a VPN in front of it? Is defense in depth no longer a good strategy?
- fulafel 7y agoThos doesn't pan out in practice. One the VPN is there, people get lazu & complacent about implementing strong security inside. Defense in depth is a concept that should be applied with some thought, it would be good if your additional layer did something different. For example good reactive security, endpoint attestation, etc.
- jeroenhd 7y agoWhy limit yourself to TLS 1.2? What's wrong with TLS 1.3?
- winthrowe 7y agoI think the point is more to block 1.0 and 1.1.
- davedx 7y agoIsn't the point of a VPN to provide network level security in addition to application level access control security? Multiple layers, security in depth...