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I think there’s a distinction to be made between a tu quoque fallacy and something like an economists “revealed preferences,” the way people act gives you infor
by ksdale 7y ago
I think there’s a distinction to be made between a tu quoque fallacy and something like an economists “revealed preferences,” the way people act gives you information about How they feel about the truth of an assertion.
In the article he says if the jackpot is happening, it’s been happening for the last hundred years, and I agree with that, but I don’t think it’s happening (in the sense that I assign a very, very low probability to 80% of humans dying). I do think climate change is a very serious problem and have adjusted my behavior accordingly, but if I thought 80% of humans were going to die, I would adjust my behavior a lot more, and if William Gibson doesn’t adjust his behavior a lot more, then I think it’s plausible to assign a higher probably to him being a fool or him not actually believing the jackpot will happen. The latter seems more likely.
And I understand that from a logical perspective, what I believe about William Gibson has no bearing on whether the jackpot will happen, but it seems like the best way to judge the likelihood of something like that is to evaluate the statements and actions of lots of smart people.
- natmaka 7y agoAdjusting your behavior implies more than 'effectively believing'. It also implies that you feel concerned by the threat (some, even believing there is a real threat, just cannot change their habits, or don't care because they are old/lonely/egoistic/...). It also implies that you think that adjusting your behavior will have a non-neglectable impact (one may doubt so, and even doubt that it may create an example for others to follow...). Smart people are able to learn and to solve problems, and it helps when it comes to predicting the future, but does being smart always 'sufficiently helps' when it comes to predicting? Is there a single case of society able to alleviate some catastrophic total slow-moving failure, thanks to a consensus among smart people? There are, for sure, numerous cases of such failures not only neglected but often dynamized by the elites (the 'Collapse' book authored by J. Diamond seems pertinent). We may also try to define who is smart (chose a topic, write a list of 'smart people' names, show it to friends in order to verify if they agree with you, or want to eject some names and add others you don't want in). If everyone can only add names the resulting list will contain 'smart people' rarely agreeing (and act the same way), controversy is the rule and consensus the exception. It may mean that most of us judge that 'smart people' are people they agree with. Nothing new here... Moreover various assertions now considered false were consensual among the very tip of 'smart people' (the few ones considered smart by most) for a fair amount of centuries. In my opinion in our huge societies everything moves too quickly, and there are too many interactions, for even the smartest to really understand, bar to predict anything. Given this perspective hoping that an unique and central government will solve anything seems grotesque, those chiefs will simply resume the "let's feign to understand, and avoid attempting any potentially decisive action" game already running and the resulting centralization (=> bureaucracy) will only create new challenges.