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> One might say the whole effect of the domino theory was to justify US military intervention against Russia and every single place they did, it backfired. A f
by wahern 7y ago
> One might say the whole effect of the domino theory was to justify US military intervention against Russia and every single place they did, it backfired.
A few counter examples: Greece, [South] Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia.
Chile is another well known example, though IMO U.S. involvement is wildly exaggerated. AFAIU, it was conservatives in the Chilean Congress that engineered and pushed for the coup. The prospect of American support (e.g. a wink from the CIA) simply made it a marginally easier sell among the people whose heads might roll if it failed.
None of which is a defense of the Domino Theory or a comment on the merits of intervention. The take away from all of this, IMO, is to avoid grand strategic theories and goals--context matters.
- ggm 7y agoIf you think Phillipines or Indonesia worked, I think you're wrong. Both have systemic corruption, massive structural issues and lingering left wing and Islamic rebellion. Indonesia killed millions in their counter communist reaction. Greece I grant you, "worked" within the limits you aren't a left wing Greek. The US wound up having to play in Greece and Turkey simultaneously, nobody is happy in the middle east really.
- ggm 7y agoI suppose they "worked" in as much as US economic benefits ensued.
- wahern 7y ago> If you think Phillipines or Indonesia worked, I think you're wrong. Both have systemic corruption, massive structural issues and lingering left wing and Islamic rebellion. Both of those countries would have had systemic corruption and massive structural issues either way, just as they had before. U.S. intervention doesn't really figure into it. Anyhow, the goal was to stop the spread of communism, not lift people out of poverty. The genocide of "communists" (i.e. Chinese and other outgroups) in Indonesia was absolutely abhorrent and a gross moral failure on the part of the U.S. But from the perspective of American geopolitical interests intervention wasn't a failure. It almost certainly wasn't even necessary, either, but that's beside the point. Non-intervention has its own problems, too, as exemplified by Cambodia, Rwanda, and Syria[1]. Intervention vs non-intervention is a false dichotomy. To reiterate, context matters. [1] I've said before on HN that I think Obama's refusal to directly intervene in Syria showed exceptional leadership, notwithstanding his about-face; indeed, because of his about-face. But that doesn't absolve the U.S. of its sins for having created the conflagration in the Middle East that resulted in the Syrian conflict. What Obama finally accepted, but everybody else refused to admit (including his own advisors), was that the U.S. was politically incapable of making the necessary commitments. Had the U.S. been capable--i.e. if the context were different--then greater intervention would have been the correct thing. What makes his decision so profound to me was that he accepted that reality at a moment when denial was easiest--when everybody felt it was the morally righteous thing to do (and arguably was), everybody wanted it, and when after it inevitably led to more bloodshed nobody would have ever blamed him, neither contemporaneously nor in the future.