>> Designed to be as secure as a one-time pad, > That immediately shows that the person writing it doesn't know cryptography. You simply can't get the security

>> Designed to be as secure as a one-time pad, > That immediately shows that the person writing it doesn't know cryptography. You simply can't get the security of one-time pad [..] Talking about a one-time pad at all in the context of making something actually secure for internet usage, shows that the talker doesn't know about cryptography. A one-time pad having "perfect security" is only true in the context of a particular security model that doesn't generally hold true on the internet - one where the adversary cannot change the ciphertext whilst it is in transit. Under a more realistic security model, we need a message authentication code or some other equivalent, to protect against adversaries changing the ciphertext. It's a well-known theorem of modern cryptography that in fact if you don't have secure authentication under this model, then you cannot achieve secure privacy. In other words, your ciphertext has to be bigger than the plaintext for security on the internet. (There is in fact a one-time-pad equivalent for MACs where your key is the length of the plaintext and the ciphertext ends up being several multiple times the length of the plaintext, but crackpots when making security arguments about "one-time pads" generally aren't referring to this and aren't even aware of the existence of this. It's a relatively unknown construction and nobody really talks about it in the context of serious modern cryptography.)