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This seems unnecessarily alarmist. DNS over HTTP doesn't protect against state-level legally-mandated surveillance because it's not designed to protect against
by ajross 7y ago
This seems unnecessarily alarmist. DNS over HTTP doesn't protect against state-level legally-mandated surveillance because it's not designed to protect against state-level legally-mandated surveillance. There are no solutions to the problem you posit that don't involve SOME kind of trusted name authority somewhere that is, effectively by argumentative fiat (i.e. not really) "out of the reach" of whatever government it is that you don't trust. That's not something you're going to find a technical solution for.
The real problem addressed by DoH is the routine surveillance and hijacking of "presumptively public" names by local network operators. And it works comparatively well for that.
- nullc 7y agoBy "comparatively well" you mean defeated in bulk by deploying sampled netflow with a couple lines of router configuration-- which almost all major ISPs already have deployed for monitoring purposes.