3 ms·

SMS and phone calls. The infrastructure is all there already. Interestingly, the EU's position on this looks really confused. SMS messages should (in theory) o

SMS and phone calls. The infrastructure is all there already. Interestingly, the EU's position on this looks really confused. SMS messages should (in theory) only transit their own local telcos. The USA doesn't get a look-in unless it hacks the telcos themselves. What the EU is doing here is routing all Commission traffic through US based server farms and roots of trust. The phones are controlled from the USA, the comms services are too. So their own local firms can no longer see the traffic but US firms can (Signal claim this isn't the case but people are wising up to the fact that this can't be true until more infrastructure is in place). What actual threat are they trying to block here?

squiggleblaz 7y ago
> What actual threat are they trying to block here? A large powerful country ruled by a megalomaniac who has proved he isn't afraid to ruin his country's reputation by abusing his power.
- thu2111 7y ago
  Assuming you mean the USA, best way to solve that is for the data to never cross into US controlled facilities or equipment at all. Using apps made in California on operating systems also made in California to send messages to servers controlled from California and then trusting that the encryption works the way they say it works makes much less sense than just sending messages through EU carriers. Consider, the Signal threat model assumes that you can't trust telcos. That's usually based on the assumption that you're some ordinary grassroots citizen who might be spied on by the government. But the EU Commission is the government. It seems a bit odd for them to implicitly assert the national European telecoms companies are untrustworthy.