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> DNS challenge is even more secure, in my opinion, as it works the same but the response code is stored in a TXT record for Let’s Encrypt to validate. In order
by xg15 7y ago
> DNS challenge is even more secure, in my opinion, as it works the same but the response code is stored in a TXT record for Let’s Encrypt to validate. In order to break this you would need control of the DNS servers.
> Now let’s contrast this with, for instance, getting a multi-year certificate from the likes of Verisign or similar: this (as far as I am aware) requires manual interaction, which can at least theoretically allow for human error, of which there are many chances.
What I've never understood is how this doesn't ultimately just shift the security risk to my DNS registrar.
Instead of social-engineering the CA to give me a cert, I have to social-engineer the registrar to store a TXT record. I don't see why one should be significantly harder than the other.
> Additionally, many more traditional CAs will let an inexperienced user have the CA generate the private key and then transmit it to the user. This opens up a LOT of dangerous possibilities, as now this private key is being saved and moved around, and could easily be missed and left on the workstation used to perform the work. Or a MitM attack could even snatch it in transit.
Again, it's harder for a rogue CA to abuse my certificate - but instead, a rogue registrar could now easily manipulate my DNS record and receive a valid cert of its own.
- Reelin 7y agoI think there's an underlying assumption that your server, your DNS registrar, and all the CAs present in your root store are trustworthy. It may not be a particularly safe assumption, but it's presumably better than unverified TLS or trust on first use (for the majority of present day usecases). If anything, I would expect universal adoption of automated verification methods to improve security. Instead of only needing to trick a single CA out of an entire root store into issuing a certificate, you would instead need to hijack the DNS listing without being noticed by _anyone_ (and hopefully all CAs, as well as everyone else, would be on the lookout for this).
- tialaramex 7y agoThis is correct. But perhaps even more correct would be to say it _consolidates_ the risk at your DNS registrar, since of course bad guys who seize control of your DNS records could anyway deny all service and capture anything unencrypted. You should definitely not use an untrustworthy DNS registrar or registry for important things, but that was true regardless and it hasn't stopped the .com TLD (which is run very badly indeed) making a tremendous amount of money.
- castillar76 7y ago> What I've never understood is how this doesn't ultimately just shift the security risk to my DNS registrar. > Instead of social-engineering the CA to give me a cert, I have to social-engineer the registrar to store a TXT record. I don't see why one should be significantly harder than the other. Rogue registrars aren't necessary: one can simply attack the registrar or interfere with the DNS traffic. These attacks have already been seen in the wild and are continuing today: check out info on DNSpionage (https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/dnspionage-brings-out-karkoff.html https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/dnspionage-brings...) and Sea Turtle (https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/seaturtle.html https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/seaturtle.html) attacks. Meanwhile, Let's Encrypt has been making some interesting changes. For instance, they just introduced multi-perspective challenges (https://letsencrypt.org/2020/02/19/multi-perspective-validation.html https://letsencrypt.org/2020/02/19/multi-perspective-validat...) in which they submit multiple challenges to the user from different network paths. Attackers hijacking network paths to interfere with challenges must then intercept all possible paths to a client, which is much harder. That said, I'm not a fan of devolving our certificate validation to DNS--it's like building a castle on Jello. It wasn't designed to be a security-first protocol, and it's definitely showing its age.