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> Well, yes, given that economies aren't organic individuals, their "feelings" will be something different. Yeah, that's kind of what I'm trying to say. The a

> Well, yes, given that economies aren't organic individuals, their "feelings" will be something different. Yeah, that's kind of what I'm trying to say. The analogy between a human organism and human society is imperfect, so I think the closest you could come to saying a society is joyous would be if the humans in the society are joyous. As for what would constitute the subjective experience of a society, you could call that the extrinsic Hard Problem of Consciousness, eh? > I also do no think it's useful to separate "economies" to study as if they were entire beings, they are a part of "societies" - this reads a lot like asking if our arms feel joy. I agree with that too. FWIW I would maybe identify money with oxygen and the economic system with the circulatory system, and maybe (parts of) some others (I'm an expert neither on economics nor physiology.)

HillRat 7y ago
If you start from philosophical questions of mind and identity (e.g., substance dualism vs physicalism, etc.), it’s not hard to get to an argument that qualia are neither substances nor physical identities but instead properties of systems (cf Whitehead), so you can ask not only “what is it like to be a bat,” but also “what is it like to be any system capable of qualia?” It’s possible that such systems could include societies, economies, corporations, and so on, depending on what you assume the criteria are for a qualia-capable system. (This is also how you get to the Gaia hypothesis, which sounds utterly crazy taken on its own, but almost axiomatic if you build it up from a systems approach to mental states with loose enough coupling and coherence restrictions). The kicker of this approach is that the modes of qualia or consciousness at different system levels are likely to be so completely alien and the causal mechanisms so hard to discern that you could never definitively answer the question of “what is it like to be an economy;” it’s as impossible as a neuron wondering what it’s like to be Proust eating his madeline. Scientifically, it’s virtually unfalsifiable but, if correct, it does have the delightful side-effect of turning social sciences such as economics from attempts to formulate natural “laws” to something more like efforts to psychoanalyze alien gods.
- azeirah 7y ago
  I appreciate your post, you make it very clear why it is reasonable to ask questions like this one, and explain why it's difficult to get to meaningful answers. It's very level-headed :)
- carapace 7y ago
  In re: Gaia, if the basis of qualia involves something cells do then (IMO) there's no inherent difficulty in assigning "mind" or subjective experience to the global ecosystem. We can "fold in" that question with the problem of human subjective experience. Gregory Bateson speculated that evolution and thought are two aspects of the same process. ("Steps to an Ecology of Mind", "Mind and Nature: a Necessary Unity") Michael Levin's lab's work on the self-regulation of living forms points to ambient intelligence. The cellular machinery that neurons use to think is common to all cells. It's concentrated and accelerated in neurons but the clear implication (IMO) is that all life thinks. "What Bodies Think About: Bioelectric Computation Outside the Nervous System" (youtube.com) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18736698 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18736698

HillRat 7y ago

If you start from philosophical questions of mind and identity (e.g., substance dualism vs physicalism, etc.), it’s not hard to get to an argument that qualia are neither substances nor physical identities but instead properties of systems (cf Whitehead), so you can ask not only “what is it like to be a bat,” but also “what is it like to be any system capable of qualia?” It’s possible that such systems could include societies, economies, corporations, and so on, depending on what you assume the criteria are for a qualia-capable system. (This is also how you get to the Gaia hypothesis, which sounds utterly crazy taken on its own, but almost axiomatic if you build it up from a systems approach to mental states with loose enough coupling and coherence restrictions). The kicker of this approach is that the modes of qualia or consciousness at different system levels are likely to be so completely alien and the causal mechanisms so hard to discern that you could never definitively answer the question of “what is it like to be an economy;” it’s as impossible as a neuron wondering what it’s like to be Proust eating his madeline. Scientifically, it’s virtually unfalsifiable but, if correct, it does have the delightful side-effect of turning social sciences such as economics from attempts to formulate natural “laws” to something more like efforts to psychoanalyze alien gods.

azeirah 7y ago
I appreciate your post, you make it very clear why it is reasonable to ask questions like this one, and explain why it's difficult to get to meaningful answers. It's very level-headed :)
carapace 7y ago
In re: Gaia, if the basis of qualia involves something cells do then (IMO) there's no inherent difficulty in assigning "mind" or subjective experience to the global ecosystem. We can "fold in" that question with the problem of human subjective experience. Gregory Bateson speculated that evolution and thought are two aspects of the same process. ("Steps to an Ecology of Mind", "Mind and Nature: a Necessary Unity") Michael Levin's lab's work on the self-regulation of living forms points to ambient intelligence. The cellular machinery that neurons use to think is common to all cells. It's concentrated and accelerated in neurons but the clear implication (IMO) is that all life thinks. "What Bodies Think About: Bioelectric Computation Outside the Nervous System" (youtube.com) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18736698 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18736698