5 ms·
Kind of an edge case privacy issue, IMO. Imagine if the page has 10 parts. Part 1 has an image reference hosted on part1.imagehost.xyz, but loaded lazily. Each
by netsharc 7y ago
Kind of an edge case privacy issue, IMO.
Imagine if the page has 10 parts. Part 1 has an image reference hosted on part1.imagehost.xyz, but loaded lazily. Each part has something analogous, an image hosted on a different domain, but loaded lazily (so, no requests before that part of the page is visible).
If you open the page and read from the top, the browser will open with part 1, Javascript will fire and tell the browser to load part1.imagehost.xyz/image1.jpg, causing a DNS lookup, HTTP(S) connection, and a request. And so on for each part (interestingly this way you can do a timing to see how fast the user is scrolling past each part).
But if the browser directly loads part 8 (the part with cancer in the example), and the Javascript only asks to load part8.imagehost.xyz/image8.jpg, the fact that the browser only asks the DNS for this hostname will reveal to the DNS admin that the reader followed a link straight there.
But if it's some health portal under the evil company's control, it seems like it'd be easier to write Javascript to fire an event to do server-side logging/send an email alert to HR if someone spends a lot of time reading the cancer section...
- ghostpepper 7y agoI read it as the opposite, where the evil party doesn't control the browser but they can sniff traffic on the network and now they can see which part of a page you requested instead of merely which page. I am not a web dev so I'd love to hear someone with more knowledge spell out some other privacy concerns.
- squeaky-clean 7y agoThat's also how I understand it. It requires a very specific and uncommon set of circumstances, but it could leak info to someone observing. But also I think the main issue "pes10k" has is that it is adding a new attack vector in a backwards-incompatible way. So a sensitive website which is doing these JS lazy-loading things was "safe" last week, but now can potentially leak information in a way it couldn't have with earlier chrome versions. In practice though it's hard (for me) to think of a website working this way. I understand the idea of a network admin sending the CEO a link with the text-fragment "cancer" in it. And if that fires off related requests unusually, I can assume it auto-scrolled to "cancer", and the CEO has cancer and sell all my shares. But what sort of website will dynamically contain the word "cancer" for patients that have cancer and is also doing fancy lazy-loading stuff? I'm not a security expert though and I know people can are much cleverer than me when it comes to exploits.
- netsharc 7y agoYou're very right, what is the chance that this set of circumstances occur anywhere on the web? It seems like the person describing the scenario was just pulling a theory out of thin air in hopes to convince someone how terrible this is...
- adrianmonk 7y agoThe privacy risk makes some logical sense, but I don't see why it doesn't also apply to regular old anchors that have been around for forever. That is, the same sort of information leak has already been possible for decades on sites that allow the URL to just have #cancer. If this is really an issue worth solving, doesn't it need to be solved for all cases, both traditional #foo links and also these new pattern-style links? I can understand that this new mechanism will probably increase how often it can happen, but blocking the new mechanism would only solve part of the problem. To solve the whole problem, you'd have to do something like turn off lazy loading. Anyway, if the reason the person is visiting the page is to read the section about cancer, aren't they usually going to manually scroll to the section about cancer a lot of the time? So the resource will still be loaded, just a little bit later. The scroll bar is moving to that position either way. The only information leaked is who moved it, the referer or the end user.
- tpmx 7y ago(Most insightful comment so far.) I've really been missing this kind of functionality. Modern sites are built by people who apparently don't know or care about HTML name anchors. There is still a need to link to specific parts of pages, particularly in online discussions. The privacy aspect seems insanely overblown to me, for the reasons you outlined. I do understand why Brendan is using this moment to criticize this. It's on-brand (his Chromium fork has a privacy angle), and it is going to get him exposure because the supposed bad guy is Google. Don't get me wrong, they (Google) are not "good guys" by default any longer. This thing though? Not so sure. I think it will make things more good than bad, on average.
- adrianmonk 7y agoYeah, I agree that even assuming someone is making the right decision, it doesn't necessarily make you feel good about the fact that it's theirs to make.
- jannotti 7y agoOne difference is that today's page anchors are only put there by the page author, so, since all authors are cracker-jack security experts, they would not have made an anchor available in such a sensitive part of the document, since it opens their readers up to this risk. As you can tell, I think that the difference is a real, technically true difference, but the implication is a bit dumb, since authors do not have this kind of thing in mind when deciding whether to anchor. You might as well be mad about lazy image loading too. If a browser is smart enough to only load images near an anchor, then this same risk would have been opened up when that was introduced. (The author wrote the anchor before lazy loading, so they correctly perceived no risk, then lazy loading turned it into a risk.)