I read this more as a condemnation of email itself, and less about PGP. PGP aligning with how email actually works and the author not liking the effects is a p

I read this more as a condemnation of email itself, and less about PGP. PGP aligning with how email actually works and the author not liking the effects is a pity, but by comparison it's a whole other dichotomy from something like a mediated end-to-end crypto scheme. Those kind of systems have the exact oppose set of problems from PGP conceptually, and note this ignores the geriatric architecture of PGP to some extent. Assuming PGP were re-invented right now, I'd still like it to mostly stay the same. That is to say, I'd like to be able to have private/public keys stored in something conceptually similar. I'd like to see slight ease-of-use improvement in signing objects, encrypting objects, etc... but the basic functionally be the same. Finally I'd like to see integration with other transports made more modular and around an API versioning system that moves forward. That is to say, If I sign my emails, I'd like to be able to communicate that the other end should be on an API above some level, or similar setup. Finally, there would bee some more thought put into people who want to advertise their keys on public directories. The aforementioned API versioning and modular remarks head into this direction. People want to communicate their keys, and it should be easy for social networks, or whatever directory lookup providers that would be created can be accommodated. This is key People like things like the signal protocol, but they want to manage all the stuff in the middle themselves, or whatever that entails. Some people may want to fly bellow the radar, and not have anything to do with an automated system, or run sneaker-nets like some old school cloak-and-dagger stuff from KGB or CIA. Anyways, email is terrible. But to conflate the problems of email over to PGP is a bit weird, but it's nice to recognize the real issue of using both.