3 ms·
Fine, I'll bite. A phone number is far more identifying than 10+ years' worth of email metadata. Anonymous email is still possible (if difficult); anonymous ph
by lmm 7y ago
Fine, I'll bite.
A phone number is far more identifying than 10+ years' worth of email metadata. Anonymous email is still possible (if difficult); anonymous phone numbers largely are not. And if your adversaries are state-level then your phone number gives them not only your name and address, but also a direct and easy way to track your location in realtime.
OpenPGP's key rotation remains the closest thing to a practical approach that actually exists. No supposedly "secure" messenger has managed to do better: either your contacts' keys sometimes change for reasons that you don't understand and you occasionally get told to "press OK to continue", or they don't change at all. That is not a sustainable approach for real security.
As the article points out, snake-oil encryption products are everywhere. How can you be sure you're not using one? Because tptacek posted saying this one is secure? At a minimum the product needs to be an open-source implementation of a published, established, reviewed standard with multiple independent implementations. Especially any random number generator it uses needs to be open-source, as that is the easiest way to backdoor an encryption product. And the way its cryptosystem provides security - the algorithms that it uses, the assumptions they rely on, the model and reasoning that turns those into guarantees - need to be simple enough that you can understand them, not rely on vague handwaves like "the proprietary intermediary server can't do anything except during the initial handshake, or if the client ends up redoing the initial handshake, but don't worry about what circumstances might cause that to happen".
Signal is unsafe and cannot be made safe. Stop using Signal.
(If you want something more constructive, work on better UI to make OpenPGP key rotation easier (using subkeys, they're right there in the protocol), better implementations of OpenPGP (i.e. more usable libraries), or non-email OpenPGP messengers to avoid the metadata issues)