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This is not the point of the commenter you're going back and forth with on the thread, but as I read this it occurs to me that some version of the plaintext rep
by asveikau 7y ago
This is not the point of the commenter you're going back and forth with on the thread, but as I read this it occurs to me that some version of the plaintext reply problem exists in real life regardless of protocol.
That is, once the recipient has plaintext, we don't know what they're going to do with it. They could read it aloud in a crowded place. They could blab about it to all their friends. They could pass it verbatim to somebody else. Or more innocuously, they could store it in an insecure database as in this commenter's scenario.
Now, if you're using something better than email, the protocol itself won't be the problem and it's less likely (or impossible through the protocol itself) to be an unintentional plaintext transmission, so this fact is pretty moot and not at all a justification of how email clients might behave. Nobody building these systems has to necessarily be concerned about protecting against "social" types of plaintext leaks.
- tptacek 7y agoThis is what people are talking about when they talk about the "Print Screen" button or screenshots or securing the clipboard. But I'm not kidding about the "inevitable plaintext reply" problem. Everyone I know who has used PGP at scale has seen it. These aren't people deliberately doing dumb things; they're doing things a bad tool begs them to do, because the underlying system is designed for, expects, begs for plaintext. Nobody can do anything about people deliberately subverting the security of their privacy tools. There's nothing deliberate about plaintext replies. The people who do that don't want their messages sent in plaintext.
- asveikau 7y agoI know. I am not claiming otherwise.