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Email+PGP may have some usability flaws, but it far surpasses the security of Signal against powerful adversaries, especially concerning metadata. Signal leaks

Email+PGP may have some usability flaws, but it far surpasses the security of Signal against powerful adversaries, especially concerning metadata. Signal leaks your phone number which can easily be traced back to your physical location and identity, while email+PGP can be used over Tor or a similar anonymization network.

ComputerGuru 7y ago
I actually use PGP. Your comment complexly glosses over the “email” part. It’s “easy” to send an smtp email over tor without giving up too much info via side channels. (It’s impossible to get the message you sent to reach the inbox, though.) But to reliably anonymously receive emails is a different story. It’s really hard for the average person to get a persistent online email address without a phone number, without going through google, without paying with a credit card, without being tracked back by your provider, etc etc. It’s not very different from Signal in that regard.
- dooglius 7y ago
  As a test, I just created a new email via Tor Browser: hn22373017@cock.li It took a few minutes, though admittedly I had to disable noscript. Now, I agree that the average person is going to have a hard time with this, and that's unfortunate. And indeed, I will admit that something like Signal is the better overall trade-off for the average person--largely because the average person doesn't have anything like the NSA in his threat model. But for people who do, and who are sufficiently technically capable, Signal isn't enough.
lvh 7y ago
Can you describe how Signal leaks your phone number and what capabilities and adversary needs to get it? (I know the answer, I am asking rhetorically, because I don’t think that someone who knows the answer would make that case.)
- dooglius 7y ago
  An adversary could compromise the signal server and observe how messages are routed. Applying pressure or coercion to achieve this is well within the capabilities and willingness of state-level adversaries. An adversary could also compromise the person you are communicating with, not to mention cases where you don't want to leak your physical identity to a someone you are messaging.
koevet 7y ago
Exactly, not to mention that mobile smart phones are inherently insecure, having enormous attack surfaces.

ComputerGuru 7y ago

I actually use PGP. Your comment complexly glosses over the “email” part. It’s “easy” to send an smtp email over tor without giving up too much info via side channels. (It’s impossible to get the message you sent to reach the inbox, though.) But to reliably anonymously receive emails is a different story. It’s really hard for the average person to get a persistent online email address without a phone number, without going through google, without paying with a credit card, without being tracked back by your provider, etc etc. It’s not very different from Signal in that regard.

dooglius 7y ago
As a test, I just created a new email via Tor Browser: hn22373017@cock.li It took a few minutes, though admittedly I had to disable noscript. Now, I agree that the average person is going to have a hard time with this, and that's unfortunate. And indeed, I will admit that something like Signal is the better overall trade-off for the average person--largely because the average person doesn't have anything like the NSA in his threat model. But for people who do, and who are sufficiently technically capable, Signal isn't enough.

lvh 7y ago

Can you describe how Signal leaks your phone number and what capabilities and adversary needs to get it? (I know the answer, I am asking rhetorically, because I don’t think that someone who knows the answer would make that case.)

dooglius 7y ago
An adversary could compromise the signal server and observe how messages are routed. Applying pressure or coercion to achieve this is well within the capabilities and willingness of state-level adversaries. An adversary could also compromise the person you are communicating with, not to mention cases where you don't want to leak your physical identity to a someone you are messaging.

koevet 7y ago

Exactly, not to mention that mobile smart phones are inherently insecure, having enormous attack surfaces.