6 ms·
Here's the problem with encrypted email: there is only a very, very narrow threat model that it (additionally) protects against. In any sane setup, your (and y
by jcranmer 7y ago
Here's the problem with encrypted email: there is only a very, very narrow threat model that it (additionally) protects against.
In any sane setup, your (and your recipient's) email client will use encrypted connections to and from your respective email servers. Any competent email provider will use MTA-STS, ensuring that no one but the sender, receiver, and respective MTAs can read the message [1]. All this happens for regular unencrypted email, without any effort on the user's part.
So encrypted email purports to drop the ability to allow the MTAs to read the email. But... they don't really do that. Your email providers are required to MITM all of your email, and can trivially modify any plaintext attribute they want to. And anyone who has credentials to your email account can also trivially MITM all incoming email (and may be able to at least social engineer outgoing email, if not MITM as well). This means that pretty much any key discovery mechanism that allows an unencrypted email to initialize or update a public key is defeated [2].
So, encrypted email only provides extra security in those cases where: a) keys are negotiated completely external to email (in which case, why bother with email?), or b) you trust the email provider enough to not try to intercept your messages but not enough to not look at your messages without your permission. Given the BOFH principle (i.e., administrators have no inclination to look at your email because you're boring), that kind of means the second case doesn't really exist as a practical concern. You can improve your security in the second case simply be deleting emails from the server immediately, again not requiring encrypted email.
So... why bother with encrypted email? Unencrypted is secure enough unless you're paranoid, and if you're more than very slightly paranoid, encrypted email isn't secure enough.
[1] This is all happening via TLS, which has gone far, far further than PGP or S/MIME have in actually making "no one can read encrypted text" true. The latter protocols take the stance that "using the cipher.encrypt() is good enough," which has been known to be false for decades.
[2] And DANE-PGP is right out, because your email provider is of course the one publishing your public key.
- tptacek 7y agoI'd love to know what you thought I got wrong.
- buzzkillington 7y ago>keys are negotiated completely external to email (in which case, why bother with email?) Because I've been using that method for close to 15 years now?
- tptacek 7y agoPeople used FTP for decades, too.
- buzzkillington 7y agoAnd they still do. I worked at a market maker that used ftp over ssh to move over 10b a year in trades between its various offices.
- angry_octet 7y agoHas anyone told them there might be a better way?
- yread 7y agoWhat is better than (S)FTP? Or do you mean MFT, AS2?
- whoopdedo 7y agoSFTP shares only those three letters with FTP but is otherwise a completely different protocol. It's also a counterpoint to one of the OP's points which is that trying to secure email is a dead-end that we should give up on. It may be possible, though very difficult, to transition to secure email. But it would have to be a brand new protocol not tacked-on to the current system. The way that SFTP is the appropriate upgrade path for FTP and not FTPS.
- jimktrains2 7y agoThe interface of sftp is largely the same as ftp. You can give someone an sftp client, username, and password and they wouldn't be able to tell the difference. A new e2e protocol that works just like email does would be excellent, but we don't yet have that. Signal &co are chat apps with a different feel and purpose and other than matrix and xmpp not federated, which is a non starter for many entities.
- AstralStorm 7y agoYou forgot about signatures, which TLS does not provide. Nor does Signal. (In a meaningful manual way.) PGP and S/MIME do. The latter is used for all sorts of official messages for exactly that reason. Unauthenticated encryption is rather worthless. Repudiation is a separate matter and threat model.
- sterlind 7y agofwiw keybase supports simple and easy signatures (and less verbose than PGP.) combined with an (imo) much more rational and discoverable attestation of identity, I think it's nearly ready to supplant PGP for this use case. email integration for signatures would indeed be nice.
- dependenttypes 7y ago> Unauthenticated encryption is rather worthless How so? Mind you, unauthenticated encryption in terms of signal does not mean that anyone can forge a message, rather that you can't prove to a 3rd party that this was a message sent by the sender rather than forged by you.
- lvh 7y agoSure! Use minisign/signify, and see OpenBSD for an example of people who do this who care extremely deeply about non-repudiation.
- blacklion 7y agoa) DH scheme was invented specifically to solve this problem. And, yes, I could pass my public key via other means, which is not as convenient as e-mail. Including paper card in anti-tampering envelope, is I'm paranoid enough. b) I'm my own email provider, but I don't trust my server provider (they could read HDD of my server), for example. Or my recipient's provider.
- alwillis 7y agoDANE is only an option if your zone is DNSSEC signed and you have control of your DNS. Of course, there are other ways you can go: https://slxh.nl/blog/2016/pgp-and-dns/ https://slxh.nl/blog/2016/pgp-and-dns/ You’re in control of publishing your public key, not the email provider. I’d be remiss if I didn’t tell you how bad MTA-STS is: * MTA-STS: compromise for the DNSSEC-challenged * Still can and should prefer DANE outbound * Authenticates domain control via CA leap of faith * Vulnerable to MiTM at cert bootstrap * Vulnerable to weakest root CA, and unauthorized certs * Open to downgrade on first (or irregular) contact * Complex mix of HTTPS, unsigned DNS and SMTP
- jcranmer 7y ago> You’re in control of publishing your public key, not the email provider. This is only true if you personally fully own the domain and have control of the DNS and other services, which is not the case for the utter majority (at least 99.9%, maybe a few more 9s) of the population. Of course, in that case, you are pretty much the email provider, so not trusting the email provider is a pretty questionable scenario at that point. > MTA-STS: compromise for the DNSSEC-challenged Yeah... DNSSEC is a classic example of a solution looking for a problem. Most of your criticism would apply equally well to not using DANE for TLS, and every browser vendor has looked at it and decided against it because it adds no security.
- alwillis 7y agoHaving cryptographically signed DNS records that can’t be forged and can be validated is good thing, which is what DNSSEC provides. Right now, DANE is the only way to mitigate downgrade attacks with SMTP and TLS connections. Apparently use of DANE for email is growing [1]. DANE hasn’t taken off with browser vendors because of their concern about additional DNS lookups when making TLS connections. [1]: “Number of DANE-enabled mail domains growing exponentially”—https://www.sidn.nl/en/news-and-blogs/number-of-dane-enabled-mail-domains-growing-exponentially https://www.sidn.nl/en/news-and-blogs/number-of-dane-enabled...
- 7y ago
- belorn 7y ago> Unencrypted is secure It is not. Unencrypted is environmental pollution that need to be actively prevent until it reach zero use. A favorable future is one where the firewall blocks any unencrypted traffic by default. Similar, giving third party clear text copies of private information is not secure. It is never going to be secure, and the only half working solution there is the kind of heavy legal regulations and systems that does not exist anywhere yet. If people want to debate over which end-to-end encryption scheme is best then they can do so as much they want, but in the end the goal here is to stop plain text from continuing harming people.
- jcranmer 7y agoYou managed to cut out the key word in the quote: unencrypted is secure enough. Email is protected with TLS on all every hop if your provider is competent. My point is that this protection is sufficient for most purposes. Where it is not sufficient, email encryption doesn't actually add the protection you probably wanted (this is the what the original article is detailing).
- belorn 7y agoThe optimal provider in those cases is oneself, running the email on an disk encrypted server, using dane, dnssec, and strict dmarc policy to match (should be noted that the author of this article are also against some of those technologies, and if I recall right, also against people running their own email server). Project like freedom box could make email encryption obsolete, but thats not because unencryption would be secure enough. It would be because the encryption would be moved away from the individual email and onto the whole server.
- joshuamorton 7y agoYes, because the security from using Gmail is higher than what you will get for running your own server. Because Gmail does all of those things, and spends more money and effort making sure they do it correctly than you will over your lifetime. If you have secrets where you believe that, say, a government will extrajudicially lean on Google to access them, theres am equally, or even higher likelihood that you misconfigured something somewhere and leaked your data.