3 ms·
But in use for all the clients that the EFAIL people tested. That was not the problem. The problem was that there were email clients that were loading image URL
by upofadown 7y ago
But in use for all the clients that the EFAIL people tested. That was not the problem. The problem was that there were email clients that were loading image URLs from HTML emails. There was nothing to fix in the case of GPG2. It was entirely a problem with the way that certain email clients handled HTML emails ... a problem, might I add, that still exists today. They just prevented the one type of attack. There will undoubtedly be others that may or may not involve encrypted emails.
- joshuamorton 7y agoQuoting efail.de: > However, we found that several clients only gave a warning to the user for invalid MDCs, but still displayed the modified plaintext. This allowed the CFB gadget attack despite the MDC No, the problem was that clients would render a plaintext known to have been tampered with. This was exacerbated by a zero click gadget, but would still have been an issue if images weren't loaded and a malicious link was clicked. You're right that Gpg wasn't shown to be broken, but pgp was. (This is the CBC attack, not the direct attacks on clients which are just client bugs, which themselves aren't direct evidence that a protocol is broken)
- upofadown 7y ago>You're right that Gpg wasn't shown to be broken, but pgp was. GPG2 is the ubiquitous implementation. You mean the OpenPGP standard was broken? I don't understand what you mean.
- joshuamorton 7y agoSorry yes. The standard was broken. The underlying crypto isn't broken by some measures, but the protocol as a whole was.