Great point! Sorry, I should have been clearer: the pernicious part is in _explaining how PGP and encrypted is bad_, which is a Herculean task because there's a

Great point! Sorry, I should have been clearer: the pernicious part is in _explaining how PGP and encrypted is bad_, which is a Herculean task because there's always another little use case broken in its own subtle way. TLS and SSH have that problem far less, because where they have issues (e.g. SSLv3, let's say), the issues are singular (e.g. the problem is that the obvious way to implement this introduces a padding oracle), not like GPG, where the issues are fractal (e.g. this isn't a real authenticator and consumers can be tricked in unauthenticated data -- a problem that requires a constellation of both GPG's broken crypto but also the specific context of e-mail and also a vulnerable client).