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The author is presenting a binary view of email security. It's true that email as a protocol has inherent insecurities ; and it's also true that dedicated, ric
by einpoklum 7y ago
The author is presenting a binary view of email security.
It's true that email as a protocol has inherent insecurities ; and it's also true that dedicated, rich spies are probably able to exploit many of them even with encrypted message bodies.
But most of us are facing the problem of MASS SURVEILLANCE, which statistically is more serious.
So:
1. Stop using spied-upon email servers:
1.1 Drop your Gmail, Yahoo mail, Microsoft etc. mail accounts, in favor of non-US and/or non-huge-corporation mail service providers.
1.2 Try to get your friends and family to drop theirs. Yes, I know this is extremely hard...
1.3 Try to get your workplace / NGOs you volunteer in to drop use of those servers (and also of Google Apps, Office 365, Skype etc. which have strong tie-ins with the email services).
2. Use mail clients which auto-encrypt messages to recipients with known keys - like EnigMail for Thunderbird.
The more of that is normalized, the harder
- lvh 7y agoIf you're going to do 1.2 and 1.3 and get everyone to make massive changes to how they operate, why not just use a secure messenger instead of trying to shoehorn privacy onto a protocol designed for when the Internet had like five computers on it and all the people knew each other?
- einpoklum 7y agoBecause email and secure messaging are not the same thing, and the latter does not replace the former. Now, there could be a distributed infrastructure for "email" that's not SMTP-and-IMAP/POP3-based, theoretically, based on what is now used for secure instant messaging - but I can't just recommend this to individuals. Also, my suggestions do not make email private, they reduce the exposure to large-scale surveillance and make it more difficult to target individuals. Also, they do not involve "shoehorning" as far as user experience is concerned.
- cjbprime 7y ago> But most of us are facing the problem of MASS SURVEILLANCE All that you're accomplishing by switching to decentralized servers is publishing the metadata that you claim to be concerned about for free. Before, someone had to serve Google a valid subpoena to find out who you've been talking to. After, you're just broadcasting it publicly across the net in network header logs.
- einpoklum 7y agoYou're misinforming people. Nobody has to hand Google anything. The NSA has direct access to their systems and can take in as much as they want. This is not a conspiracy theory - it is public knowledge thanks to the Edward Snowden leaks.
- joshuamorton 7y agoCan you cite that this is true today?
- einpoklum 7y agoSeriously? :-(
- joshuamorton 7y agoYes, as far as I can tell you're claiming one of three things 1. Google actively assisted the NSA with data collection, beyond legal obligations (subpoenas etc.) 2. The NSA had a way of legally compelling companies to provide direct access to systems and can do arbitrary processing on company internal data 3. The NSA was snooping in Google's systems without Google's knowledge in 2013, and this hasn't been fixed 7 years later. As far as I know, the Snowden leaks don't provide any real evidence for (1) or (2), and so are an extraordinary claim without evidence. (3) also seems rather unlikely. Hence the question.
- cjbprime 7y agoI think OP is talking about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_(surveillance_program) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_(surveillance_program).
- joshuamorton 7y agoI'm aware. My statement still stands.
- BlueTemplar 7y agoA secure messenger that is standardized. While Signal has actively resisted that.