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> The clipboard should not, nor should applications be able to, alter the copied content from the visibly-selected content. This might feel intuitively right,
by alkonaut 7y ago
> The clipboard should not, nor should applications be able to, alter the copied content from the visibly-selected content.
This might feel intuitively right, but it severly limits the usefulness of the clipboard.
It then becomes a basic plain text clipboard
Try opening an rich text editor (e.g. https://quilljs.com/playground/ https://quilljs.com/playground/) and selecting two words of which one is bold. Hit Ctrl+C. What is now on the clipboard? What happens when you paste? You have your formatting preserved. The editor has intercepted the copy command and stored data only it knows how to create and parse. The same would happen in a diagram editor (a selected shape would perhaps be stored as some json representation), or an image editor.
The problem is that the clipboard as an established concept already means "area where programs write their custom formatted data and where any app can read the same data upon paste".
Restricting it might be a good idea in some cases, but it's the user expectation so it's what apps (including browsers) need to do as the default. This unfortunately means that abusing it as in the article will be possible. There is no way for the browser to know whether the changed content was formatting tags (good) or trashing the selection by adding a copyright (bad).
- dredmorbius 7y agoIf you want to pass rich text or spreadsheet cell formulae, display those before selecting. Which puts the onus on the application to provide that functionality. That preserves the functionality, respects the "copy visibly-selected content" directive, and makes clear just what is being saved to the clipboard, making sneak attacks more difficult. Argument that the clipboard behaves in a way that is demonstrably prone to malicious attack is simply argument from tradition. Yes, that's how things have been done. We're discovering that how things have been done leads to strongly negative consequences.
- alkonaut 7y agoNot sure I follow, how should the argument display the rich text (markup/formatting instructions) before the selection? The displayed/selected content might be Foo Bar but the content I want on the clipboard could be Foo <i>Bar</i> but I never want to see the markup, only the formatted text. I don’t want to make a two step function where I need to reveal a textual description of the content and select that. The markup might be a base64 encoded piece of binary gibberish in the case of a visual diagram for example.
- dredmorbius 7y agoThat would be unsupported functionality. You cannot both have transparent copy capability and copy hidden content without revealing it. Copying visual content would be subject to different requirements and limitations. But for text: what you see is what you get. If you're copying glyphs alone, those are what are copied. If you want formatting, you'll need to have the source application reveal that.
- alkonaut 7y agoIt could be an option that is revealed after a warning. "This page wants to use the javascript 'copy' event to place transformed data on the clipboard. If you accept it would place [data shown] on the clipboard, otherwise it would place [raw text] on the clipboard". What do you want to do? copy text? copy data? [ ]remember my choice for this site. Here, data shown would probably be some info about the data rather than the data itself. It could be a 2mb base64 bitmap... However, perhaps a better alternative would be to offer both "copy text" and "copy" where the former just copies selected glyphs as plaintext while copy fires the js event allowing the transform. The important thing to remember is that webpages in 2020 must work like users expect desktop applications to work, and interact with desktop applications (e.g. copy rich content from webpage to desktop must be a default enabled feature or the user will consider the browser broken). For this reason, I don't think it's a viable solution to disable the js event by default (i.e. to hook Ctrl+C to the "copy text" function).
- dredmorbius 7y agoHow would you institute that in the clipboard logic and independently of the app? Because we're no longer operating in a world in which apps or processes are trusted or trustable. Maybe the ones you write, maybe if you're really lucky the ones that come with your fully-vetted Linux distro. But not npm installs, not proprietary binaries, not website logic, and most especially not the crap that's distributed on mobile app stores. Your OS, you've got to trust. Which means that the logic's in the clipboard. And how can the clipboard know that the application is attempting to change contents such that the clipboard won't receive what it is that you see? That's a key reason I see this as something that 1) has to be in the clipboard logic and 2) has to exclude applications entirely from the copy process. The clipboard should be acting on, say, the graphics render layer directly, outside the application's scope.
- mattkrause 7y agoInterestingly, I can copy text from Pages to Word and the formatting is (somehow) preserved, even though this version of Word predates Pages by a few years. Perhaps the clipboard contents are somehow tagged with their source so the destination can do something intelligent with its contents? This would potentially provide another way to lock down the clipboard: fishy photo filter can get access to an image on the clipboard (or maybe only images from certain sources), but not text.