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> what I hear is "they feel they have to support it, and as long as they have to support it they're going to do it right, unlike other CAs". Did you hear that
by tialaramex 7y ago
> what I hear is "they feel they have to support it, and as long as they have to support it they're going to do it right, unlike other CAs".
Did you hear that from @cpu too? Is it an actual quote, or is this you paraphrasing again and it might be completely wrong?
Regardless this did prompt me to go back and look at what became https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/3726 https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/3726 and confirm that yeah, they still don't get it. Must try harder.
I thought I did a pretty good job of spelling out what needs to happen to have confidence here, using an example from EMV of what not to do - but it didn't have the desired effect and this is still the same "parse first, regret later" approach that is ultimately why that PR even exists in the first place (Let's Encrypt were mis-parsing CAA records and discovered in post mortem their records weren't good enough to actually figure out the impact from the incident).
> Another thing you're well aware of was that one of the key design goals for SSL/TLS was not to depend on the DNS for security.
I can't figure out any way to squint at this which makes it both true and non-trivial.
In practice what Netscape did was punt to the existing Certificate Authorities and carefully avoid asking awkward questions about how they did it. This achieves a goal "not to depend on the DNS" only in the same sense that that chap the other day was able "not to depend on a mobile phone" by just getting a friend to receive all their calls for them and pass on messages...
For many years what the Certificate Authorities actually did was not officially documented anywhere. But we do have some amazing patents they filed to protect their "innovative" solutions. They're uh... they're very bad. Go read some, you can laugh now because none of this is permitted any more. What we know of the unpatented stuff they did was mostly worse. Would you be surprised that OCRing the images from anti-spammer WHOIS websites was an actual thing that an actual trusted Certificate Authority was doing to figure out the contact email address for a domain? Guess how reliable that was...
- tptacek 7y agoWould you like me to simply ask @cpu? You can too. I stopped at "I think DNSSEC is rubbish and so does the whole Boulder development team". I'm not sure how your argument hasn't been comprehensively refuted at this point. I would love to take a merry walk with you through the tls-wg mailing list posts about dnssec-chain-extension, which I feel fairly confident I can show you've mischaracterized. The whole thing is really funny. I don't think this has been an especially productive exchange on HN itself, but since we both appear on opposite sides of the DNSSEC issue every time it comes up here, and your arguments tend to involve subtleties of what Lets Encrypt does or doesn't do, I appreciate the opportunity and motivation to read up on specifics, so that I can more quickly shut down this bad argument when it's brought up again. Thank you!