4 ms·
> Since browsers are the only important customer of DANE, it's funny to see them referred to as "the anti-DANE lobby". In the context that's exactly what they
by tialaramex 7y ago
> Since browsers are the only important customer of DANE, it's funny to see them referred to as "the anti-DANE lobby".
In the context that's exactly what they are? DANE proponents securing server-to-server email wanted to have an HSTS-style flag for TLS so they could use it for "OK this server says it always does DANE, if I try to connect in future and can't get DANE that's an attack, I'll just spool the mail". They wrote a simple draft which was then proposed for adoption by the working group. The honest thing for the anti-DANE lobby to do was reject adoption. The draft could proceed as an independent submission and live or die on its own. But instead tactically browser vendor participants supported adoption, and then stalled the process asking for endless tweaks and extra stuff even though they had no intention to deploy it. Basically they ensured it wouldn't get finished and adopted in a timely fashion. AIUI Kathleen chewed people out for abuse of process, everybody was very contrite but the harm can't be undone.
- tptacek 7y agoYou're talking about chain-extensions? Can you address anything I actually said? That all the browser developers as a bloc will pressure standards groups not to make more DNSSEC happen is not something I'm interested in litigating. Since they're the model consumers of DANE, it's weird to refer to them as a lobby; it's like talking about "the user lobby". It's a semantic point and not an important one, so I'm fine to stipulate that "almost everyone who will ever have to deal with DANE" constitutes "the anti-DANE lobby".
- tialaramex 7y ago> Can you address anything I actually said? Here? Or in the Twitter thread where for some reason rather than quote what I wrote you decided to make stuff up about me claiming Let's Encrypt loves DNSSEC ? Let's try this: > it doesn't matter, because nobody signs their zones. Last century when I spent a lot of my spare time working on a vanity site with friends that site didn't have HTTPS. These days the same site (now mostly historical) does have HTTPS. Did HTTPS not matter last century? Did it start mattering? When and how did that happen? No, HTTPS mattered all along but ordinary people don't really prioritise security. It's a long way behind like dental hygiene and remembering grandma's birthday, and like those it'll only get done if it's made as convenient as possible. So that's what we have to do. Well, that's what we should be doing. Instead you're arguing for the status quo for the past half a decade or so. > That all the browser developers as a bloc will pressure standards groups not to make more DNSSEC happen is not something I'm interested in litigating DANE was undeployable. But what they learned with TLS 1.3 was that if something is undeployable (originally TLS 1.3 was undeployable) you can fix that through a mixture of encrypting more things and lying to middleboxes. So that's what you should be expecting. The future isn't a closed web where everything is just Facebook posts but to a middlebox it may look that way because it turns out that middleboxes allow Facebook posts unmolested (People who sign off on buying a middlebox don't know what TCP/IP is but they use Facebook and they'll be angry if it stops working) and so it's easier to just disguise say a DNS request as a Facebook post and then unwrap and decrypt it at the destination. Only half joking.
- tptacek 7y agoYour claim is that the ISRG and Lets Encrypt are secretly supporters of DNSSEC, and that DNSSEC is importantly involved in DV challenges at Lets Encrypt. But as you well know, virtually none of the DV challenges done by Lets Encrypt use DNSSEC in any way. Lets Encrypt is not operationally dependent on DNSSEC. If the root DNSSEC keys landed on Pastebin tomorrow, literally nothing would change at Lets Encrypt. That's not hyperbole; if it's inaccurate in any way, it'll be in some nitpicky way that will probably just prove my point. We apparently both have, in some sense, sources from ISRG. They're apparently saying conflicting things, because the ISRG people you've heard from would speak up for DNSSEC if it weren't for their fear of me arguing with them. I have less faith in my ability to shout down Lets Encrypt staff than you do, and also people telling me the exact opposite of what you are about their take on DNSSEC; what I hear is "they feel they have to support it, and as long as they have to support it they're going to do it right, unlike other CAs". But rather than accepting these weird secondhand arguments, we can just look at the actual behavior of Lets Encrypt: * LetsEncrypt.org isn't DNSSEC-signed. * The ISRG's own site isn't DNSSEC-signed. * LetsEncrypt is investing in non-DNSSEC DNS security tools. * LetsEncrypt doesn't even suggest that users enable DNSSEC. Make a more persuasive argument. Meanwhile: TLS has always mattered, because TLS actually does something meaningful to protect traffic. DNSSEC does not. That is the reason we had a push to "encrypt the web" that involved getting everyone onto TLS, and no corresponding effort to do the same with the DNS. Another thing you're well aware of was that one of the key design goals for SSL/TLS was not to depend on the DNS for security. I'm still not clear on whether you're talking about chain-extensions or something else. Chain-extensions is pretty funny. I'm happy to drill into it if you want. Later I guess we don't have to take secondhand arguments for this anymore after all: https://twitter.com/cpu/status/1228036536500879362 https://twitter.com/cpu/status/1228036536500879362
- tialaramex 7y ago> what I hear is "they feel they have to support it, and as long as they have to support it they're going to do it right, unlike other CAs". Did you hear that from @cpu too? Is it an actual quote, or is this you paraphrasing again and it might be completely wrong? Regardless this did prompt me to go back and look at what became https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/3726 https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/3726 and confirm that yeah, they still don't get it. Must try harder. I thought I did a pretty good job of spelling out what needs to happen to have confidence here, using an example from EMV of what not to do - but it didn't have the desired effect and this is still the same "parse first, regret later" approach that is ultimately why that PR even exists in the first place (Let's Encrypt were mis-parsing CAA records and discovered in post mortem their records weren't good enough to actually figure out the impact from the incident). > Another thing you're well aware of was that one of the key design goals for SSL/TLS was not to depend on the DNS for security. I can't figure out any way to squint at this which makes it both true and non-trivial. In practice what Netscape did was punt to the existing Certificate Authorities and carefully avoid asking awkward questions about how they did it. This achieves a goal "not to depend on the DNS" only in the same sense that that chap the other day was able "not to depend on a mobile phone" by just getting a friend to receive all their calls for them and pass on messages... For many years what the Certificate Authorities actually did was not officially documented anywhere. But we do have some amazing patents they filed to protect their "innovative" solutions. They're uh... they're very bad. Go read some, you can laugh now because none of this is permitted any more. What we know of the unpatented stuff they did was mostly worse. Would you be surprised that OCRing the images from anti-spammer WHOIS websites was an actual thing that an actual trusted Certificate Authority was doing to figure out the contact email address for a domain? Guess how reliable that was...
- tptacek 7y agoI found, by the way, Melinda Shore's "abuse of process" messages on the tls-wg mailing list, and they appear to be directed at the proponents of the dnssec chain-extensions draft.
- tialaramex 7y agoIf you're going to Google "Melinda Shore abuse of process" you'll have more fun reading about rehired (the "visibility" proposal for TLS 1.3 from Nalini's lot) for which Melinda suggested that a proposed way of disposing of rehired was an abuse of process (others had proposed, perhaps not entirely seriously that since its authors and supporters had no intention of actually showing up to justify it, the in-person meeting should conclude it had consensus to reject the whole thing outright on the spot). She's technically right that time too. Anyway I wasn't talking about Melinda, who as a co-author would be in your terminology one of the proponents that you think she's directing that message at, I was talking about Kathleen Moriarty at IETF 103. The chair's choice of phrasing "This was not our finest hour" undersells it somewhat.
- tptacek 7y agoI don't know what Google search you're talking about, nor did I know who Melinda Shore was before reading these messages. What I did was go to the tls-wg mailing list archive, search for "dnssec-chain", and read every message on the list. I'm comfortable saying you've misrepresented the discussion. It was just funny to roll across messages about "abuse of process" saying the exact opposite of what you're saying here. Links to your messages are welcome.