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When you ask Let's Encrypt to do a dns-01 challenge for example in order to obtain that TLS certificate, their resolver will do DNSSEC to determine either that
by tialaramex 7y ago
When you ask Let's Encrypt to do a dns-01 challenge for example in order to obtain that TLS certificate, their resolver will do DNSSEC to determine either that your challenge answer is authentic or that proof is available that your zone isn't signed.
For everybody without a signed zone, it would be trivial for a resourceful adversary to pass the challenge by simply interposing to give a bogus answer to the query. Only people with DNSSEC actually get cryptographic security here.
Whether it's surprising that most people (where "most people" includes big banks for example) are comfortable with basically just relying on the honour system as good enough is I suppose a judgement about how smart you think people are or how much they actually care about security.
- tptacek 7y agoVirtually none of the dns-01 challenges handled by LetsEncrypt involve DNSSEC in any way, and the architects of LetsEncrypt do not depend on or, in reality, care about DNSSEC or expect it to be an important part of their service. The parent commenter is correct: the complete failure of DNSSEC among browsers ends the viability of the protocol. Stick a fork in it.
- tialaramex 7y ago> the architects of LetsEncrypt do not depend on or, in reality, care about DNSSEC Key personnel from ISRG (the charity which builds Let's Encrypt) have HN accounts, but mostly steer clear of contradicting HN Fan Favourite Thomas Ptacek because it's not worth it even when he says things which are directly contradicted by the facts. However I am a sucker and will respond to point out, once again, that in fact Let's Encrypt obeys the ACME RFC in this respect (as well it might given that two of the RFC's editors are key personnel for Let's Encrypt and both ACME and Let's Encrypt are bound together from the outset) and so yes of course it does DNSSEC validation. The anti-DANE lobby from browsers (which caused a pretty nasty scene for the TLS WG) doesn't change the facts which made DNSSEC necessary and that's why the solution for problems keeps being DNSSEC no matter how much you say it mustn't or shouldn't. The same browsers are currently working on ESNI which, punts the authenticity problem back to DNSSEC because that's the only way it gets done. And they're working on DNS records to drive HTTP/3 without Alt-Svc (and throw in ESNI at the same time) and those punt authenticity to DNSSEC as well, for the same reason. No matter how hard you shove your fingers into your ears, the authenticity problem has to be solved in DNS and that's what DNSSEC does.
- tptacek 7y agoThis is needlessly uncivil. Please edit stuff like "HN Fan Favorite Thomas Ptacek" out of your comments in the future; I don't write that way at you, and the guidelines here tell you not to. I'm sorry that you aren't the only person in the world that knows people involved with CA operations, but, like you, I've been working in this field for "more than 10 years". If you read my short comment more carefully, you'll see that I didn't say that LetsEncrypt doesn't do DNSSEC. It does, unlike other CAs that claimed to do DNSSEC and then stopped. My point, of course, is that it doesn't matter, because nobody signs their zones. Since browsers are the only important customer of DANE, it's funny to see them referred to as "the anti-DANE lobby". Is it a "lobby" when it's the entire population? Were the Romans the "anti-Visigoth lobby"? Your premise that browsers using DNS means browsers will have to use DNSSEC is obviously flawed; browsers rely on DNS today, and not a single one of them does DNSSEC. The ones that tried, stopped. Make more persuasive arguments. It's not my fault, or the result of a message board popularity contest, that anyone can simply look at a list of the most popular and important sites on the Internet and see that virtually none of them are DNSSEC-signed, or observe that it's been 25 years of standardization effort with DNSSEC to no avail, or to poke around in their browser, the most important piece of Internet software they run, and see that it has no support for DNSSEC, or find articles from the TLS architects of browsers explaining why they can't get DANE to work. Those are just facts. They're not personal attacks on you. ps Here's a link from another person who doesn't want to wade into the orange site to make a point, about LetsEncrypt doing multi-perspective lookups, which protect DV challenges from spoofing and, of course, do not rely on DNSSEC, which nobody uses: https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/acme-v1-v2-validating-challenges-from-multiple-network-vantage-points/112253 https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/acme-v1-v2-validating-ch... pps If ISRG is so bought into DNSSEC, why isn't LetsEncrypt.org signed?
- tialaramex 7y ago> Since browsers are the only important customer of DANE, it's funny to see them referred to as "the anti-DANE lobby". In the context that's exactly what they are? DANE proponents securing server-to-server email wanted to have an HSTS-style flag for TLS so they could use it for "OK this server says it always does DANE, if I try to connect in future and can't get DANE that's an attack, I'll just spool the mail". They wrote a simple draft which was then proposed for adoption by the working group. The honest thing for the anti-DANE lobby to do was reject adoption. The draft could proceed as an independent submission and live or die on its own. But instead tactically browser vendor participants supported adoption, and then stalled the process asking for endless tweaks and extra stuff even though they had no intention to deploy it. Basically they ensured it wouldn't get finished and adopted in a timely fashion. AIUI Kathleen chewed people out for abuse of process, everybody was very contrite but the harm can't be undone.
- alwillis 7y agoTurns out DNSSEC-signed CAA records provide cryptographic proof that can be archived and used for auditing purposes that a particular issuer of certificates was indeed authorized to do so for a particular domain. DNSSEC also enables them to verify whether empty CAA records are intentional or the result of something malicious. From https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844#section-4.1 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844#section-4.1 Use of DNSSEC to authenticate CAA RRs is strongly RECOMMENDED but not required. An issuer MUST NOT issue certificates if doing so would conflict with the relevant CAA Resource Record set, irrespective of whether the corresponding DNS records are signed. DNSSEC provides a proof of non-existence for both DNS domains and RR set within domains. DNSSEC verification thus enables an issuer to determine if the answer to a CAA record query is empty because the RR set is empty or if it is non-empty but the response has been suppressed. Use of DNSSEC allows an issuer to acquire and archive a proof that they were authorized to issue certificates for the domain. Verification of such archives MAY be an audit requirement to verify CAA record processing compliance. Publication of such archives MAY be a transparency requirement to verify CAA record processing compliance.
- tptacek 7y agoEveryone in this thread knows what a CAA record is. Once again, it is my claim that Lets Encrypt does not operationally rely on DNSSEC. Nick Lamb disagreed, and suggested that ISRG staff would stick up for DNSSEC but for my presence on the thread. I reply with a quote from a Lets Encrypt developer: "I think DNSSEC is rubbish and so does the whole Boulder development team". I think you should take this up with them.
- alwillis 7y agoEveryone in this thread knows what a CAA record is. That’s not the point, although I doubt most people on this thread knew that the use of DNSSEC is strongly recommended for issuers of certificates. I’m pretty sure Lets Encrypt doesn’t operationally depend on DNSSEC, but if they’re issuing certificates to a zone with DNSSEC-signed CAA resource records, that’s irrefutable proof of the intent of the zone operator, something that Lets Encrypt and other issuers of certificates should probably pay attention to, regardless of the personal feelings of their engineers about any particular standard. Without DNSSEC, there’s no way to know if the CAA records have been tampered with when using something like ACME.
- tinus_hn 7y agoSo how are you going to ‘simply’ intercept their resolver requests from multiple locations distributed globally? Not to say it isn’t an issue but it is quite far in the theoretical realm.
- throw0101a 7y ago> So how are you going to ‘simply’ intercept their resolver requests from multiple locations distributed globally? Up until now, you only had to intercept one path: > On Wednesday February 19th, 2020 we’ll turn on stricter validation requirements 30 in production. We’ll make multiple validation requests from different network perspectives. * https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/112253 https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/112253
- tialaramex 7y agoMake a "mistake" with BGP. China, just a big example, has a lot of incidents where a Chinese ISP advertises routes to addresses nowhere near China and no doubt if it needed to it can explain every single one of those incidents as an understandable human error of some kind. No real harm done, right?