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DNSSEC would only be of relevance if records could cryptographically sign TLS certificates. Since no browser today can do that, DNSSEC is a dead technology.
by londons_explore 7y ago
DNSSEC would only be of relevance if records could cryptographically sign TLS certificates.
Since no browser today can do that, DNSSEC is a dead technology.
- rhn_mk1 7y agoIt covers pretty much the same use case for email with DKIM.
- vegardx 7y agoI guess you could call all optional technology for dead then, but it's super useful for things like ssh fingerprints (SSHFP), and I imagine they're also useful for things like public keys for IPSec (IPSECKEY) and other types of certificates (CERT), like GPG public keys.
- alwillis 7y agoDNSSEC prevents certain kinds of attacks, like cache poisoning, on the DNS system and a little over 15% of internet hosts are behind resolvers that validate DNSSEC signatures when making DNS requests. You’re thinking about DANE’s TLSA records, which supports trusting certificates not signed by the CAs browsers already trust. DANE does require DNSSEC to work but that’s not what the article is about.
- tptacek 7y agoDNSSEC attempts to prevent certain kinds of attacks that have already been designed around in the Internet threat model; we have spent the last 30 years of Internet security design working towards an Internet where it doesn't matter if you can poison a DNS cache, because nothing trusts the DNS anymore. For most practical purposes, we are already there, and the trajectory to get all the way there (essentially: decisively and finally solving WebPKI certificate misissuance) is clear. DNSSEC doesn't matter; the parent commenter is right.
- wbl 7y agoThe definition of mississuance is based on DNS data so DNS does matter for CAs. Conceptually DNSSEC would help except no one uses it.
- tptacek 7y agoI'm glad you acknowledge that nobody uses DNSSEC. It is not, however, the case that DNS is required to verify domain ownership, or even the only automated way. It's just the most common way. Nor is the the case that DNSSEC is the only way to protect DNS lookups; it's not even the most common way.
- alwillis 7y agoConceptually DNSSEC would help except no one uses it. Some stats from this April 2019 presentation [1]: * 91% of TLDs (.com, .org, .edu, etc.) are signed, including root, which was signed in 2010. * about 20% of internet users are using validating resolvers, mostly thanks to Google and Cloudflare. I'd add Comcast too. * Over 50% of the zones in .nl, .se and .no are DNSSEC-signed [1]: https://www.isc.org/docs/dnssec-eco-de-20190410.pdf https://www.isc.org/docs/dnssec-eco-de-20190410.pdf
- tptacek 7y agoTLDs being signed doesn't mean anything, except that for the 9% of TLDs that aren't signed it's literally impossible to sign zones under them. TLD signatures are de facto required. What's actually damning is that DNS customers, including the ones with the savviest security teams, aren't opting in, and haven't for many, many years. They all have a choice whether to sign or not, and they choose not to. Unlike TLD signatures, that actually is a strong signal. Signatures of European zones aren't interesting because they're done automatically by registrars. That's theater, not security.
- alwillis 7y agoHere’s more actual data on DNSSEC. Spoiler: DNSSEC use is going up; DANE usage is way up: https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/# https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/#
- alwillis 7y agoBTW, Comcast, among other ISPs, uses a DNSSEC-aware DNS resolver for its customers. That doesn’t sound dead to me.
- tptacek 7y agoThe net effect of that for Comcast customers has been outages unique to Comcast, such as the botched launch of HBO NOW. Meanwhile, virtually none of the sites people at Comcast visit are signed with DNSSEC, nor are they ever likely to be, so essentially the whole function of Comcast's DNSSEC service is to reduce reliability for its users.
- tialaramex 7y agoWhen you ask Let's Encrypt to do a dns-01 challenge for example in order to obtain that TLS certificate, their resolver will do DNSSEC to determine either that your challenge answer is authentic or that proof is available that your zone isn't signed. For everybody without a signed zone, it would be trivial for a resourceful adversary to pass the challenge by simply interposing to give a bogus answer to the query. Only people with DNSSEC actually get cryptographic security here. Whether it's surprising that most people (where "most people" includes big banks for example) are comfortable with basically just relying on the honour system as good enough is I suppose a judgement about how smart you think people are or how much they actually care about security.
- tptacek 7y agoVirtually none of the dns-01 challenges handled by LetsEncrypt involve DNSSEC in any way, and the architects of LetsEncrypt do not depend on or, in reality, care about DNSSEC or expect it to be an important part of their service. The parent commenter is correct: the complete failure of DNSSEC among browsers ends the viability of the protocol. Stick a fork in it.
- tialaramex 7y ago> the architects of LetsEncrypt do not depend on or, in reality, care about DNSSEC Key personnel from ISRG (the charity which builds Let's Encrypt) have HN accounts, but mostly steer clear of contradicting HN Fan Favourite Thomas Ptacek because it's not worth it even when he says things which are directly contradicted by the facts. However I am a sucker and will respond to point out, once again, that in fact Let's Encrypt obeys the ACME RFC in this respect (as well it might given that two of the RFC's editors are key personnel for Let's Encrypt and both ACME and Let's Encrypt are bound together from the outset) and so yes of course it does DNSSEC validation. The anti-DANE lobby from browsers (which caused a pretty nasty scene for the TLS WG) doesn't change the facts which made DNSSEC necessary and that's why the solution for problems keeps being DNSSEC no matter how much you say it mustn't or shouldn't. The same browsers are currently working on ESNI which, punts the authenticity problem back to DNSSEC because that's the only way it gets done. And they're working on DNS records to drive HTTP/3 without Alt-Svc (and throw in ESNI at the same time) and those punt authenticity to DNSSEC as well, for the same reason. No matter how hard you shove your fingers into your ears, the authenticity problem has to be solved in DNS and that's what DNSSEC does.