6 ms·
Is the safe going to be drilled on the livestream in front of the witnesses? Or are the key material devices and the HSM going to be accessed outside of the cer
by sneak 7y ago
Is the safe going to be drilled on the livestream in front of the witnesses? Or are the key material devices and the HSM going to be accessed outside of the ceremony for potential tampering?
Seems to me that exceptions and anomalies like this are the weak points of the system. If I wanted to steal these keys, I would make an effort to create anomalies like this where I might have physical opportunities to glitch the keycards and exfiltrate the data without the whole internet watching me.
- edf13 7y agoWith a tinfoil hat on - how do you know the livestream isn't pointed at some fake studio and the real safe hasn't already been tampered with?
- pas 7y agoYou never know, after all maybe your whole life just happens inside a big box (or a small one if you are a simulated/real brain in a vat). But if you accept that it's possible to gain some information, and to basically slowly build up a model of the real, so you can start trusting sources of information, eventually you can build a ceremony model and there are designated witnesses, and designated key-holders. And in theory press should regularly interview them to make sure they are trustful, mentally okay, they are not blackmailed, or otherwise tampered with, and what they say about the process, safe, stream, etc. So in the end it's all about your priors. If you have an almost unmovable belief about we're all just being lied to, then you might never (as in not in <100 years) update to the alternative belief.
- mrob 7y agoI don't know what the IANA is doing, but this is essentially the same problem as verifying election results, with the same solutions: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Election_monitoring https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Election_monitoring
- exabrial 7y agoThey could sign a piece of data you provide (pseudo random proof) that they have no control over
- sneak 7y agoThe third and fourth and fifth party witnesses/keyholders that aren't part of the safeholders who are present for the ceremony. They verify the fingerprints of the signing keys and such, ensuring that they are using the right keys and cards and that the final product generated then-and-there actually ends up in the zone. Getting all of those people, chosen for trustworthiness and various distribution of national origin, to cooperate with such a fraud conspiracy as you describe is deemed to be sufficiently difficult as to be beyond the means of the organization.
- IgorPartola 7y agoWorst Oceans movie yet.
- akerl_ 7y agoOutside of making a potentially amusing movie plot, what would be the impact of someone stealing the DNSSEC root keys on the day-to-day activity of folks using the internet?
- hannob 7y ago> If I wanted to steal these keys The question is: Why would you want to steal these keys? What are you going to do with it? This is all big theatre around a technology that has barely any meaning in practice. Nothing relevant would break if you publish these private keys on the Internet tomorrow.
- sneak 7y agoStealing the KSKs for DNSSEC would enable an isp or government to spoof signed dns replies to any validating resolver they wished to lie to sometime in the future. Some people, somewhere are relying on public keys or fingerprints published in DNS. Presumably, more will do so in the future.
- sp332 7y agoSome people, somewhere are relying on public keys or fingerprints published in DNS. I think this is begging GP's question. Is there really any such person?
- jacobr1 7y agoEveryone using email under conditions where DKIM is important
- tptacek 7y agoThis is circular. All you've said here is that stealing the KSKs for DNSSEC would enable an ISP or government to defeat DNSSEC. The comment you're responding to accepts that, but argues (correctly) that it doesn't matter if you defeat DNSSEC, because nothing important relies on it.
- alwillis 7y agoit doesn't matter if you defeat DNSSEC, because nothing important relies on it. Not true. I would say secure email is something important and that relies on DANE, which requires DNSSEC. Good video on this: https://youtu.be/BhvU19RJrPY https://youtu.be/BhvU19RJrPY DANE’s TLSA records is the only method available to ensure that email is always encrypted between hosts. Otherwise it’s too easy for someone to MITM a connection and downgrade the connection. And actual data on DNSSEC and DANE usage shows DANE usage is way up: https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/ https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/
- Y-Bopinator 7y agoAbsolutely not. This would demonstrate the safe’s weaknesses and compromise it’s security.