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Assuming investors in these ISAs are rational/smart, they'll take into account the likely outcomes before deciding how much they're willing to pay. So, even if
by rahimnathwani 7y ago
Assuming investors in these ISAs are rational/smart, they'll take into account the likely outcomes before deciding how much they're willing to pay.
So, even if Lambda sells each ISA the moment it's signed, they're still just as incentivised to do a good job. Because the sale price will be determined by the expected cash flows which, in turn, are affected by how good a job Lambda school does.
It seems just like any other form of factoring: you've got receivables which are due in the future, and you're willing to take a haircut to get paid sooner.
I don't know whether Lambda school provides a good service and/or whether the ISAs they offer are a good deal for the students.
But the point of the article is that selling the ISAs or pools of ISAs weakens incentives. I don't see how that follows. If anything, it makes incentives stronger: if Lambda does a bad job, this will affect the money they receive today (via sale of ISAs) rather than money they'll receive over time (from student incomes).
- danso 7y agoThe WIRED article that Verge references points out a few ways where securitized debt could provide perverse incentives, particularly in terms of cost/quality of the teaching: https://www.wired.com/story/how-we-learn-lambda-income-sharing-agreements/ https://www.wired.com/story/how-we-learn-lambda-income-shari... > Still, that points to a more complicated “incentive alignment” than is often described. Deference to outside investors might encourage a school to issue lots of ISAs and keep instructional costs low, for example, betting high margins on a few successful students will subsidize the other agreements, says Julie Margetta Morgan, a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute who studies student debt. That’s especially true if it proves difficult to link students with jobs. But Allred insists the incentive structure that aligns the interests of individual students with the school’s isn’t broken. “We still hold the bulk of the risk,” he says. Allred doesn’t tell staff which student’s contracts have been financed. That said, I don’t know enough to think that CDOs in themselves are bad, or in any way unusual or suspect. But Lambda and Edly refusing to comment and taking down pages about the CDOs and investments, as DHH tweets about them, makes me very confused and suspicious.
- rahimnathwani 7y agoThe example given "betting high margins on a few successful students will subsidize the other agreements" is a possible strategy, but that strategy could be attractive/optimal regardless of whether the ISAs are sold. What about the ISAs being sold to third parties affects the incentives? Whether or not thet sell the ISAa, Lambda school should be trying to maximise the margin between the cashflows from the ISAs, and the cost of running the program.
- boublepop 7y agoSelling the ISAs moves the incentive from ensuring the students can pay back to marketing the fact that the students can pay them back. It means money is suddenly better spent marketing the education that executing the education, which is the same problem of misaligned inventive many other for profit education organizations suffer from. Their pitch is that they are different because students don’t just directly pay tuition. Selling the ISAs means they are no different in practice.