4 ms·

I actually doubt this is the case. Pings probably happen on some relatively-predictable interval, while a back-and-forth conversation between two parties is goi

I actually doubt this is the case. Pings probably happen on some relatively-predictable interval, while a back-and-forth conversation between two parties is going to result in push notifications with much shorter intervals than any reasonable ping implementation would use. The metadata might be limited in value, but it still has some value, and I think it could easily be distinguished from pings. Do you have any references for your assertion?

sliken 7y ago
Sure a determined attacked with control over hardware in the network path can analyze the timing and packet sizes. However a smart application/protocol writer could make make a ping and a message delivery take the same number of bytes. Which of course means some wasted payload on pings. Additionally if trying to track peers you could every N seconds send a ping OR a message. After all if you succeed in sending a message you know the peer is reachable. So it's possible, but no idea how careful OpenPush is though.
- _-___________-_ 7y ago
  Any attacker in a position to inspect traffic in the path between a push service and a mobile device is probably determined. I agree about the countermeasures, though.
  - sliken 7y ago
    I've pondered DHT nodes for a basis privacy protecting network of peers. There's a fair bit of traffic for tracking peers. Each peer could use their peerID as a public key. A bit of padding on the normal traffic (mostly get, put, ping, and findpeer) could hide messaging. Likely not a good fit for TCP streams (like tor), but could easily hide enough bandwidth for instant messaging (like signal) or email, er email like service. Could hide store/forwarding, include onion routing (bouncing through a few nodes), and be quite resistant to traffic analysis. If each node send X packets of Y bytes to Z nodes per minute then it would be quite hard indeed to tell who you were talking to. Maybe give peers a few choices in high bandwidth, medium bandwidth, and low bandwidth configurations. All would just vary in the number of nodes they track.

sliken 7y ago

Sure a determined attacked with control over hardware in the network path can analyze the timing and packet sizes. However a smart application/protocol writer could make make a ping and a message delivery take the same number of bytes. Which of course means some wasted payload on pings. Additionally if trying to track peers you could every N seconds send a ping OR a message. After all if you succeed in sending a message you know the peer is reachable. So it's possible, but no idea how careful OpenPush is though.

_-___________-_ 7y ago
Any attacker in a position to inspect traffic in the path between a push service and a mobile device is probably determined. I agree about the countermeasures, though.
- sliken 7y ago
  I've pondered DHT nodes for a basis privacy protecting network of peers. There's a fair bit of traffic for tracking peers. Each peer could use their peerID as a public key. A bit of padding on the normal traffic (mostly get, put, ping, and findpeer) could hide messaging. Likely not a good fit for TCP streams (like tor), but could easily hide enough bandwidth for instant messaging (like signal) or email, er email like service. Could hide store/forwarding, include onion routing (bouncing through a few nodes), and be quite resistant to traffic analysis. If each node send X packets of Y bytes to Z nodes per minute then it would be quite hard indeed to tell who you were talking to. Maybe give peers a few choices in high bandwidth, medium bandwidth, and low bandwidth configurations. All would just vary in the number of nodes they track.