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I was a nuclear-trained operator on a boat of the same vintage as the Thresher. I joined it in 1970 just after it had been retrofitted with SubSafe systems and

by MurMan 7y ago

I was a nuclear-trained operator on a boat of the same vintage as the Thresher. I joined it in 1970 just after it had been retrofitted with SubSafe systems and better operational procedures that came directly from the loss of the Thresher. I'm convinced that the loss of the Thresher, as tragic as it was, saved a lot of lives. As for the documents, you need to know that Rickover classified almost everything about the nuclear program. I suspect that kind of thinking still exists and is responsible for the slow release of the document.

kevinskii 7y ago
I was a sonar tech on a Los Angeles class sub in the 90's, and so much of the training we did was explicitly based on lessons learned from the Thresher and Bonefish disasters. I agree they saved a lot of lives.
frankharv 7y ago
I was involved with Level1 and SubSafe parts as a Machinist in the 80's. First on a Sub Tender then at a Naval Shipyard. I served as Controlled Materials Petty Officer and learned the nuances of material classification. All laymen need to know is that every part of a submarine is engraved with a number that can be traced back to the site where the minerals were mined. This includes every bolt, nut and washer. A very impressive level of accountability. I have dealt with alot of green tags in my day. Generated quite a few as well from manufactured parts. What I wonder is how much the price of a sub increased after SubSafe program was started. From a material point of view the cost was around 3X for roundstock.
- frankharv 7y ago
  The Iwo Jima incident was really horrible and preventable. https://www.nationalboard.org/Index.aspx?pageID=164&ID=226 https://www.nationalboard.org/Index.aspx?pageID=164&ID=226 Brass Nuts on a 600 pound steam system. What were they thinking.
  - jacquesm 7y ago
    Conspiracy nuts? You'd almost think they were purposefully replaced. If it was designed that way than that's incompetence on a level that I'm not comfortable with, you'd imagine someone would have looked at that and said 'that's stupid'.
    - thaumasiotes 7y ago
      The report is pretty interesting. The ship was not designed that way. The nuts were installed as part of routine maintenance: > By mid October, the Iwo Jima had been operating in the Persian Gulf for approximately two months and had developed some leaks and other repair needs in the ship's 600 psi steam propulsion plant. > The ship was granted permission to dock in Manama, Bahrain (a country on a group of islands in the Persian Gulf, between Qatar and Saudi Arabia) and conduct repairs. A variety of maintenance items were planned, including overhauling the main steam valve that supplies steam to one of the ship's turbine-driven electrical generators. This valve, incidentally, could also be considered a boiler-boundary stop valve. The overhaul of this large, rising-stem, bolted-bonnet gate valve was contracted to a local ship repair company, under the supervision of U.S. Government inspectors. The mechanic conducting the repairs didn't know the requirements: > Ultimately, what was found was that a series of mistakes and misunderstandings led to this accident. > First, the mechanic wanted to replace the fasteners, but he did not have any. He also did not speak English very well. Allegedly, the mechanic asked one of the boiler room personnel for new nuts and bolts, and was given permission to look through the boiler room's spare parts bins. He selected parts that he thought would work. And an inspection that might have caused the problem got lost in the shuffle: > Secondly, with the case of the authorized inspection agency, it must be taken into consideration that there was a massive build-up of troops and ships in the Persian Gulf. It was assumed that the office was not staffed for the increased workload. Consequently, many inspections were not being conducted. > And finally, the boiler room supervisor thought that one of his subordinates had conducted an inspection. Sadly, it was never concluded that an inspection had been made. If someone had conducted an inspection, possibly he was not familiar with fastener markings, nor the job specifications. > The end result was that incorrect fasteners were chosen, and controlled inspections and testing were not fully accomplished. Really, what surprises me the most about this is that the Navy apparently doesn't repair its own ships!

by MurMan 7y ago

kevinskii 7y ago

I was a sonar tech on a Los Angeles class sub in the 90's, and so much of the training we did was explicitly based on lessons learned from the Thresher and Bonefish disasters. I agree they saved a lot of lives.

frankharv 7y ago

I was involved with Level1 and SubSafe parts as a Machinist in the 80's. First on a Sub Tender then at a Naval Shipyard. I served as Controlled Materials Petty Officer and learned the nuances of material classification. All laymen need to know is that every part of a submarine is engraved with a number that can be traced back to the site where the minerals were mined. This includes every bolt, nut and washer. A very impressive level of accountability. I have dealt with alot of green tags in my day. Generated quite a few as well from manufactured parts. What I wonder is how much the price of a sub increased after SubSafe program was started. From a material point of view the cost was around 3X for roundstock.

frankharv 7y ago
The Iwo Jima incident was really horrible and preventable. https://www.nationalboard.org/Index.aspx?pageID=164&ID=226 https://www.nationalboard.org/Index.aspx?pageID=164&ID=226 Brass Nuts on a 600 pound steam system. What were they thinking.
- jacquesm 7y ago
  Conspiracy nuts? You'd almost think they were purposefully replaced. If it was designed that way than that's incompetence on a level that I'm not comfortable with, you'd imagine someone would have looked at that and said 'that's stupid'.
  - thaumasiotes 7y ago
    The report is pretty interesting. The ship was not designed that way. The nuts were installed as part of routine maintenance: > By mid October, the Iwo Jima had been operating in the Persian Gulf for approximately two months and had developed some leaks and other repair needs in the ship's 600 psi steam propulsion plant. > The ship was granted permission to dock in Manama, Bahrain (a country on a group of islands in the Persian Gulf, between Qatar and Saudi Arabia) and conduct repairs. A variety of maintenance items were planned, including overhauling the main steam valve that supplies steam to one of the ship's turbine-driven electrical generators. This valve, incidentally, could also be considered a boiler-boundary stop valve. The overhaul of this large, rising-stem, bolted-bonnet gate valve was contracted to a local ship repair company, under the supervision of U.S. Government inspectors. The mechanic conducting the repairs didn't know the requirements: > Ultimately, what was found was that a series of mistakes and misunderstandings led to this accident. > First, the mechanic wanted to replace the fasteners, but he did not have any. He also did not speak English very well. Allegedly, the mechanic asked one of the boiler room personnel for new nuts and bolts, and was given permission to look through the boiler room's spare parts bins. He selected parts that he thought would work. And an inspection that might have caused the problem got lost in the shuffle: > Secondly, with the case of the authorized inspection agency, it must be taken into consideration that there was a massive build-up of troops and ships in the Persian Gulf. It was assumed that the office was not staffed for the increased workload. Consequently, many inspections were not being conducted. > And finally, the boiler room supervisor thought that one of his subordinates had conducted an inspection. Sadly, it was never concluded that an inspection had been made. If someone had conducted an inspection, possibly he was not familiar with fastener markings, nor the job specifications. > The end result was that incorrect fasteners were chosen, and controlled inspections and testing were not fully accomplished. Really, what surprises me the most about this is that the Navy apparently doesn't repair its own ships!