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I'm assuming by "more effectively" you mean "less shortsightedly"? In any case, such judgement is only clear in hindsight (that is, calculating effectiveness i

I'm assuming by "more effectively" you mean "less shortsightedly"? In any case, such judgement is only clear in hindsight (that is, calculating effectiveness implies a time window over which effects are to be tabulated). Most charitably, the executives perhaps felt they were making judicious, acceptable tradeoffs that would maximize business outcomes over the time horizon they were concerned with - periods measured in quarters or years or even decades. How would we incentivize people to only take profits over an arbitrarily long (and ever-widening) window? What happens when a black swan occurs and significantly drives down the effectiveness of prior decisions (which until then had been deemed quite effective)? Are profits clawed back?

whatshisface 7y ago
>In any case, such judgement is only clear in hindsight (that is, calculating effectiveness implies a time window over which effects are to be tabulated). If the judgment was really only clear in hindsight then no power structure could have altered it. What's clear only in hindsight to a CEO is clear only in hindsight to a union boss, or a collective, anyone else. >How would we incentivize people to only take profits over an arbitrarily long (and ever-widening) window? The corporation is already incentivized: in exchange for thinking about long-term profits, it is rewarded with long-term profits. However, executives often have different goals than the corporation they're supposed to represent. If you could figure out how to better align the interests of executives with their corporations, you would see more effective profit-seeking, which would include less killing due to blunders but more killing due to tobacco-industry style exploitation. Giving executives the freedom to put their own interests first (the source of next-quarterism and next-bonusism) is necessary if you want to give them the freedom to pursue ethical goals. You either trust them to make the right decisions or you don't. >Are profits clawed back? Yes! That's what happens when something causes you to lose money.

whatshisface 7y ago

>In any case, such judgement is only clear in hindsight (that is, calculating effectiveness implies a time window over which effects are to be tabulated). If the judgment was really only clear in hindsight then no power structure could have altered it. What's clear only in hindsight to a CEO is clear only in hindsight to a union boss, or a collective, anyone else. >How would we incentivize people to only take profits over an arbitrarily long (and ever-widening) window? The corporation is already incentivized: in exchange for thinking about long-term profits, it is rewarded with long-term profits. However, executives often have different goals than the corporation they're supposed to represent. If you could figure out how to better align the interests of executives with their corporations, you would see more effective profit-seeking, which would include less killing due to blunders but more killing due to tobacco-industry style exploitation. Giving executives the freedom to put their own interests first (the source of next-quarterism and next-bonusism) is necessary if you want to give them the freedom to pursue ethical goals. You either trust them to make the right decisions or you don't. >Are profits clawed back? Yes! That's what happens when something causes you to lose money.