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"Philosophy is a way to address these questions more systematically -- it takes our fuzzy concepts and intuitions and makes them rigorous... In metaphysics, for
by pmoriarty 7y ago
"Philosophy is a way to address these questions more systematically -- it takes our fuzzy concepts and intuitions and makes them rigorous... In metaphysics, for example, when we talk about ontology, we try to formalize our natural intuitions for objects"
This is only true of certain types of philosophy -- analytic philosophy and its brethren in the 20th and 21st Centuries, and some systematic philosophers of earlier times.
Nietzsche is one of the most well-known counterexamples. Writing in an intuitive, aphoristic style, he was far from interested in any kind of systematization or formalism.
The playfulness of Derrida and the approaches of some other of the Postmodernists are also the antithesis of what this article claims philosophy is about.
The Pre-Socratics and Socrates himself were not interested in systematization or formalism either. Neither was most Eastern philosophy.
Philosophic interest in formalizing only rears its head in philosophy towards the end of the 19th Century with Frege and the logical-positivists (themselves ancestors to the Analytics) who followed him.
There's plenty of philosophy that just isn't interested in this.
On the other hand, if what the author is getting at is that philosophers tend to examine the questions and subjects that interest them in a deeper way than most other non-scientist do, then I would agree with that.
- yters 7y agoA lot of Platonic dialogues and Aristotle's works are pretty rigorous like analytic philosophy. Plato also has a mythical and literary element to his dialogues, but there is also logical rigor and careful distinction. Arguably, there is a reason for the literary setting of the logic in the dialogues, more than just 'make it readable.' And if you want overboard rigor, look to the scholastics. Aquinas is nothing if not methodical. Duns Scotus gets inordinately detailed in his distinctions. I would argue that rather than being typical, the Nietszche/Derrida/etc. continental sort of philosophy is just one half of the historical philosophy coin. The best philosophers have gone hand in hand with logical rigor and literary poise.
- bananamerica 7y agoDerrida is a lot closer to literature than it is to philosophy, including Nietzsche. He’s a charlatan that uses cryptic language to make his writing seem serious and profound. Not unlike Jacques Lacan and Aleister Crowley.
- masswerk 7y agoLacan is actually surprisingly rigorous or, at least, methodical. It's just, if you attempt to talk about what preconditions language and language like structures using language, you necessarily enter a metadiscourse. (Having read Lacan in philosophy was actually of help to me to come up with some algorithms as a programmer.)
- bananamerica 7y agoIf Lacan could be methodical (and I don't think he did), it would be much in the same way psychotics can be methodical. > you necessarily enter a metadiscourse It's quite possible for metadiscourse to be also intelligible. No reason to write like a lunatic.
- masswerk 7y agoI think, much of the reception of Lacan is specific to the language, language as in translation. E.g., mind that the early US reception is somewhat unfortunate due to the translation. On the other hand, the German edition tends to be a bit pompous, probably in order to establish the text in the context of the German academic discourse of the time. (Especially the Ecrits are about unreadable at times.) The Seminars, however, are, at least in the original, colloquial, slowly spoken, trying to find appropriate words for where there are none. And he's developing a methodology of his own, for sure. He even tried to express them conclusively in mathematical formulars and diagrams ("mathemes" – yes, we may have to put an emphasis on "tried"). If you have a look at Seminar II (Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychoanalyse, 1954-1955), you even may observe that he entertained relationship with the cybernetic community, there are also traits of Rosenblut, contemporary mathematics… And, not to the least, some of Lacan's concepts seem to have shown up in FMRI findings of the last years. Edit: If we entertain for a moment Marx's thought of history being the natural history of mankind, we may assume that this natural history sediments into technological artifacts, for short, technology, machines. If we also assume some value for the concept of the moi, we may conclude that we put some of a resemblance to our own into these machines. There's a mutual inheritance in the description. And machines, which are are also kind of sediments of algorithms or symbolic forms in their own, adhere – at least to some degree – to the same preconditions. (This, BTW, is a great way of looking at 2001, A Space Odyssey.) There's something to be learned from exploring either of them. However, we may have to find appropriate methodology for each of them, according to the specific scope. Since the venture of describing the preconditions of the human psyche equals the endeavor of describing a scope from within this very scope, we also encounter Boges' paradox of the map at 1:1 scale, which doesn't do for a description. What to do about it? Necessarily, we'd have to resort to some analogies, but, at the same time, we'd have to invalidate them, in order to not fall prey to ontology. What's left? Probably a system which is built more on resonance than on conclusive description, entertained by the mutual relations and suspense of the various concepts, which, at the same time, provides proper meaning to these concepts. Some sort of a bootstrapping process. We try to talk about meaning and its constraints by the very process of making meaning. Which, BTW, is totally conclusive with post-structuralist epistemology, as long it is internally conclusive. (Mind that this is for the most in the 1950s and 1960s, at the height of the linguistic turn. – And it's a generation of French academics who were, at least to some extent, formed by the confrontation with Hegel and Heidegger, and by the example of Lévi-Strauss.)
- claudeganon 7y ago> Nietzsche is one of the most well-known counterexamples. Writing in an intuitive, aphoristic style, he was far from interested in any kind of systematization or formalism. I mostly agree with Lukacz account[0] that Nietzsche’s philosophy was actually a kind of knowing obfuscation of imperialist violence, dressed up in aphorism to make it all seem somehow heroic. While he’s not of the analytic strain, his book “The Destruction of Reason” (from which the below is excerpted) is an excellent rebuttal of this kind of irrationalism in continental philosophy, from Nietzsche to Heidegger to Late Wittgenstein (all of which also informed Derrida). [0] https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/destruction-reason/ch03.htm https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/destruction-re...