4 ms·

> they would just carry insurance against it anyway. A lot of people in this thread keep citing insurance, as if you can _just carry_ insurance for anything.

> they would just carry insurance against it anyway. A lot of people in this thread keep citing insurance, as if you can _just carry_ insurance for anything. This completely ignores the actual insurance companies in the equation. Insurance companies are not limitless pits of funds, they won't just give insurance to anyone for anything. If a manager has a track record of damaging behaviour or works in an industry that does obvious harm, why would somebody give them insurance? People are talking like the results are useless unless it personally bankrupts the managers responsible, the goal is not to hurt the person responsible as much as possible, its to actually provide compensation for victims, and provide a market force to reduce harmful behaviour. You can't just "get insurance" for anything. If you were legally liable for harms, and you had a track record of harmful decisions or work in a obviously harmful industries, then the insurance companies are unlikely to provide you insurance or will charge you high enough premiums that those who are more responsible or do safer work are economically advantaged.

AnthonyMouse 7y ago
> If a manager has a track record of damaging behaviour or works in an industry that does obvious harm, why would somebody give them insurance? If a manager has a track record of damaging behaviour or works in an industry that does obvious harm, why would somebody hire them? The liability to the corporation as things are now is the same as what it would be to the insurance company. And that's assuming that actuarially the people who have made mistakes in the past are more likely to make them in the future. Maybe the people who have made mistakes in the past are the people who have learned what not to do and are a safer choice than someone with less experience, or at least are not sufficiently more risky that the difference in insurance premiums would be prohibitively large. > People are talking like the results are useless unless it personally bankrupts the managers responsible, the goal is not to hurt the person responsible as much as possible, its to actually provide compensation for victims, and provide a market force to reduce harmful behaviour. Making the managers responsible for corporate liability doesn't do much for victims because the managers typically have far less money than the corporation itself. All it can really do is try to motivate the managers to avoid the liability, but it doesn't even do that when it's the insurance company and not the manager that pays in the event of liability anyway.
- admax88q 7y ago
  You're ignoring the fact that shell corporations used as liability shields are widespread. Look at all those abandoned oil wells that nobody will pay to clean up because the corporations that owned them don't exist anymore. Managers have assets, insurance companies have assets, shell corporations designed to shield other corporations and managers do not have any assets. > And that's assuming that actuarially the people who have made mistakes in the past are more likely to make them in the future. Moreso I'm assuming that the actual actuaries will be incentivized to assess this correctly when somebody actual has to pay when things go bad.

AnthonyMouse 7y ago

> If a manager has a track record of damaging behaviour or works in an industry that does obvious harm, why would somebody give them insurance? If a manager has a track record of damaging behaviour or works in an industry that does obvious harm, why would somebody hire them? The liability to the corporation as things are now is the same as what it would be to the insurance company. And that's assuming that actuarially the people who have made mistakes in the past are more likely to make them in the future. Maybe the people who have made mistakes in the past are the people who have learned what not to do and are a safer choice than someone with less experience, or at least are not sufficiently more risky that the difference in insurance premiums would be prohibitively large. > People are talking like the results are useless unless it personally bankrupts the managers responsible, the goal is not to hurt the person responsible as much as possible, its to actually provide compensation for victims, and provide a market force to reduce harmful behaviour. Making the managers responsible for corporate liability doesn't do much for victims because the managers typically have far less money than the corporation itself. All it can really do is try to motivate the managers to avoid the liability, but it doesn't even do that when it's the insurance company and not the manager that pays in the event of liability anyway.

admax88q 7y ago
You're ignoring the fact that shell corporations used as liability shields are widespread. Look at all those abandoned oil wells that nobody will pay to clean up because the corporations that owned them don't exist anymore. Managers have assets, insurance companies have assets, shell corporations designed to shield other corporations and managers do not have any assets. > And that's assuming that actuarially the people who have made mistakes in the past are more likely to make them in the future. Moreso I'm assuming that the actual actuaries will be incentivized to assess this correctly when somebody actual has to pay when things go bad.