2 ms·
The issue they're getting bit by now is that technically, MAX can't be architected the same way as older 737's due to the Flight Computer representing a single
by salawat 7y ago
The issue they're getting bit by now is that technically, MAX can't be architected the same way as older 737's due to the Flight Computer representing a single point of failure with catastrophic consequences.
Older 737's are fine having two separate Flight Computers with only one in command at a time. MCAS changed that. So they now have to consider significant hardware/software rearchitecture which goes beyond a mere
If(MAX){
MCAS();
} else {
otherStuff():
}
For instance, early on in the investigation, pilots had to use the NG simulators with manual fault injection to recreate the experience because the MCAS software simply wasn't there.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/newly-stringent-faa-tests-spur-a-fundamental-software-redesign-of-737-max-flight-controls/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/newly...
The "newly-stringent" tests described are basically 101 level test cases in excluding catastrophic outcomes from a design, where you basically assume the perfect confluence of bit flips occur to ruin your day. If you've done your job right, that shouldn't end up being a problem.
Boeing didn't, therefore, it was a problem.