The top-level Certification & Regulation line item is constant over just the last 3 years. I did not look at historical data going back decades. I thought that

The top-level Certification & Regulation line item is constant over just the last 3 years. I did not look at historical data going back decades. I thought that I had read reports of the FAA getting a massive funding increase for Certification but the budget seems to dispute that. So this piece of the puzzle — whether or not major new funding has been made available for Certification in the last few months — I am not very clear on. Delegation seems to have steadily increased in scope since the 1930s. A brief and interesting history of Delegation from the FAA is here. [1] It has evolved over decades to become what it is today. The specific concept of the ODA - Organization Designation Authorization — which is the program which delegates certification work to Boeing, didn’t exist until 2009. Last year Boeing had 1,500 people working internally in their ODA Compliance program, and there were just 45 people at the FAA BASOO (Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office). Cost was one factor, but perhaps not the primary driver. Wanting to leverage private industry expertise is usually the reason cited. I don’t think it was downsizing necessarily as a cost control measure. It was downsized as a policy decision that delegating increasing amounts of the compliance work to industry was the right way to get the job done because that’s where the experts were. In concept it’s almost reasonable. In practice they underestimated the degree to which Boeing could fuck up on the designs, overestimated the level of independent authority would vest in the ODAs to correct deficiencies, and I think eventually you lose “critical mass” back at home base (the FAA) and the ability to actually oversee the people doing the work. I mean, the FAA Director went on record saying they would need to hire 10,000 people to fully staff this function. This to me indicates they have lost the critical mass required to perform the role even primarily as an outsourced effort. Excerpting from PDF Page 13 of the JATR report; > The BASOO is required to perform a certification function, including making findings of compliance of retained (non-delegated) requirements, while also performing the oversight function of the Boeing ODA. The BASOO must have the resources to carry out these two primary functions without compromise. The JATR team concluded that FAA resource shortfalls in the BASOO (and other allocated resources) may have contributed to an inadequate number of FAA specialists being involved in the B737 MAX certification program. In some cases, BASOO engineers had limited experience and knowledge of key technical aspects of the B737 MAX program. > The BASOO delegated a high percentage of approvals and findings of compliance to the Boeing ODA for the B737 MAX program. With adequate FAA engagement and oversight, the extent of delegation does not in itself compromise safety. However, in the B737 MAX program, the FAA had inadequate awareness of the MCAS function which, coupled with limited involvement, resulted in an inability of the FAA to provide an independent assessment of the adequacy of the Boeing proposed certification activities associated with MCAS. In addition, signs were reported of undue pressures on Boeing ODA engineering unit members (E-UMs) performing certification activities on the B737 MAX program, which further erodes the level of assurance in this system of delegation. Further, from PDF Page 46; > The FAA initially delegated acceptance of approximately 40% of the B737 MAX project’s certification plans to the Boeing ODA. Additional certification plans that were originally retained for acceptance by the FAA were later delegated to the Boeing ODA as the certification project progressed. While the JATR team did not conduct an exhaustive review of other ODAs, the team observed that delegating the acceptance of certification plans does not appear to be a widespread practice for the FAA. “Does not appear to be widespread” seems to me to be a political way of saying “outside of acceptable practice and this should never have been done.” The next paragraph continues; > Finding F5.1-A: The FAA extensively delegated compliance findings on the B737-8 MAX project to the Boeing ODA. Safety critical areas, including system safety documents related to MCAS, were initially retained by the FAA and then delegated to the Boeing ODA. (See also Findings F4.1-A, F4.1-B, and F4.1-C.) Delegation was used to an improper extent in the project, and what little staff they had dedicated to the BASOO appear to have insufficient experience, technical expertise, or knowledge of the 737-8 systems themselves. Now the FAA is on record as saying those same people will have all the time they need to get it right without any compromises. In my experience, a team that failed under undue pressure the first time will take a deliberately exorbitant amount of time, given a second bite at the apple and the instructions to “do whatever it takes to get it done right.” [1] - https://www.faa.gov/about/history/deldes_background/ https://www.faa.gov/about/history/deldes_background/