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Apple has a list for that: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 These are end to end: Home data Health data (req
by mrtksn 7y ago
Apple has a list for that: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
These are end to end:
Home data
Health data (requires iOS 12 or later)
iCloud Keychain (includes all of your saved accounts and passwords)
Payment information
QuickType Keyboard learned vocabulary (requires iOS 11 or later)
Screen Time
Siri information
Wi-Fi passwords
The messages also end to end but the backup contains the private key.
The moral of the story is that if you want real protection, do local backups.
- novok 7y agoSo do you need to decrypt the backup of your iMessages to get to the private key inside of it, or can apple see your private iMessage keys in the backup without needing to decrypt anything?
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- ghostpepper 7y ago> The messages also end to end but the backup contains the private key. Should this even be called E2E? I suppose it is, technically, but clearly not in spirit.
- trillic 7y agoIt is if you backup your device to your Mac or PC...or don't back it up at all.
- snowwrestler 7y agoI thought iMessage private keys are somehow based on data in the "secure enclave" chip, and thus not able to be stored in the cloud. It's my understanding that Apple could add new "devices" to listen in on future conversations, but it can't read iMessage conversations in transit between existing devices. It can also read iCloud backups of conversation content, which are created by the client device after decrypting the message. But that's not the same as storing the private key itself in the backup. Happy to have my understanding updated...
- nemothekid 7y agoIf you lose your device and buy a new one and restore your device with a back up, all your messages will be returned. There’s no way to accomplish this without having the private key in the backup. EDIT: When I say there is no way to accomplish this, I’m talking specifically about the process that exists today where the user doesn’t have to remember a password other than their iCloud password (which today, can also be reset).
- ajross 7y ago> There’s no way to accomplish this without having the private key in the backup. Uh, no. There's no way to accomplish that without some kind of user-managed escrow (even a pass phrase would be fine). It's maybe not the seamless experience Apple wants to offer, but it's certainly not impossible. Frankly the kind of dummyproof restore being offered is fundamentally incompatible with private backups.
- yjftsjthsd-h 7y agoI would think that you could, however, encrypt that private key with a user-controlled password. (Granted, this should be optional and have big red warnings about being unable to recover without the password)
- jedieaston 7y agoThat’s exactly what they do for iCloud Keychain and Health data right now, so I don’t understand why they don’t do it for messages by default.
- snowwrestler 7y agoMaybe we're talking about different private keys? To clarify, here's how I think it works: 1) To send you a new iMessage, someone else's iPhone Z encrypts it with your public key and sends it through the iMessage network. Apple can't read this message since they don't have your iMessage private key, which is only on your device. 2) Your iPhone A receives the encrypted iMessages and decrypts them with your iMessage private key on your device. 3) iPhone A stores the decrypted iMessage content in its filesystem, which is encrypted locally with the device private key (derived from your device passcode). 4) Time to backup... iPhone A decrypts its filesystem with your device private key, and sends filesystem contents as plaintext, through an encrypted tunnel, to an iCloud backup server, which encrypts the backup locally with an iCloud server private key, and stores it. 5) You get a new iPhone, let's call it iPhone B. iPhone B asks iCloud for a restore. The iCloud server locally decrypts the backup, and sends it to iPhone B as plaintext through an encrypted tunnel. iPhone B receives the backup as plaintext and stores it locally, encrypting it locally with the device private key. 6) iPhone B iMessage client loads the plaintext old iMessages into the Messages client for you to read. At no point in this process would Apple have or store your iMessage private key or your device private key.
- jasonsync 7y agohttps://www.sync.com https://www.sync.com provides end-to-end encrypted cloud storage options. Disclaimer I work there.
- TheGrassyKnoll 7y agoSo does https://spideroak.com/ https://spideroak.com/ (I have no affiliation)
- brunoff 7y agoOr maybe rclone with encryption set to on. Then you have a bunch of clouds working for you with crypto which is only yours.
- j4_hnews 7y agoHave you read the SpiderOak disclaimer though? NOTE: Logging in via the SpiderOak website does temporarily allow SpiderOak employees access to your password. https://spideroak.support/hc/en-us/articles/115001854583-ONE-Web-Interface https://spideroak.support/hc/en-us/articles/115001854583-ONE...
- tamcap 7y agoThat works for any service where you don't fully control the other endpoint. They are just being transparent. Although the wording re: website is peculiar. Could it be their form of a canary like warning?
- fragmede 7y agoAs a developer, I expect that smaller shops' infrastructure isn't as thoroughly locked down and things like passwords getting logged to splunk/ELK is tech debt, and par for the course. However that's a very specific exception though, to the point that instead of putting work into adding that into their disclaimer, they could have made sure the password wasn't being logged instead.
- 7y ago
- cies 7y agoE2e means next to nothing when using closed source software. Apple could (have) issue(d) an update with code to steal yr anything, without you knowing, so FBI-or-whatever does not "complain". I currently use one e2e service, BitWarden as keychain, that ticks the boxes (e2e AND open source client).
- klodolph 7y agoThis hard line is too facile. If you are paranoid about malicious code updates, then making part of your stack open-source doesn’t matter. I could push an update to your OS that reads the keys out of your BitWarden.
- saghm 7y agoOf course, there are open source operating systems out there...
- somehnguy 7y agoYeah, I always verify the hashes of updated binaries match what I compile myself in parallel. Also that takes too much time so I just never update anything and have a homebrew version of 'Damn Vulnerable Linux'. /s
- Ajedi32 7y agoLong-term, there may eventually come a solution to this problem in the form of [binary transparency](https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Binary_Transparency https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Binary_Transparency). However, we're obviously a long way away from that being the norm, and there's still the problem of supply-chain attacks on hardware to consider.
- zaarn 7y agoI doubt the hardware supply chain can ever be secured. Even if you were to open-source every single part of manufacturing, there is no reliable way to ensure that the chip you, as a customer, have obtained, hasn't been backdoored. You'd have to delid it and put it under an X-Ray if that even resolves the tiny featuresin modern CPUs.
- tomaskafka 7y agoTwo things: 1) There is no way Apple would be allowed to sell iPhones in China, without China government having access to anything. So, I assume that Apple users in China have e2e encrypted exactly nothing. 2) I have a strong suspicion that those 'enter your Apple ID password because your account needs it' message really means 'a government has requested your data and even though it's encrypted, we will nag you about entering a password, and if you give it, you're a free game'. I don't blame Apple for this, I'm sure they're doing what they can, but when a government says 'give us this data', they can't not comply. Vote responsibly - companies can't protect us from a government we have put into power.
- baddox 7y agoMy impression is that iMessage is indeed encrypted end-to-end in China, same as everywhere else.
- filmgirlcw 7y agoiMessage is. iMessage backups are not.
- baddox 7y agoYes, same as everywhere else.
- radicaldreamer 7y agoThe key is included in the iCloud backup stored by Guizhou on the “Cloud Big Data Industrial Development Co., Ltd.“ https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208351 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208351
- baddox 7y agoIf you use iCloud backups then your iMessage key is stored unencrypted regardless of which country you're in. That's a main point of this article.
- bonestamp2 7y ago> if you want real protection, do local backups Yes, this is unfortunately true and unfortunately complicated compared to iCloud backups. I backup locally to my mac (encrypted), then I have my mac do time machine backups to my Synology NAS (encrypted) and then I have my NAS backup to BackBlaze (encrypted). I do that to satisfy the two pronged backup strategy: local (fast) and remote (slow, but useful in catastrophic local situations such as fire, flood, theft, etc).
- mthoms 7y agoI might be mistaken but I thought Backblaze doesn't backup external drives?
- pfranz 7y agoThere are a few possible approaches. I figured they're using b2. I'm pretty sure Synology has builtin tools to mirror to it. Backblaze will backup external drives that are attached to the computer, but if they are disconnected for 30+ days the data is deleted. While network drives aren't backed up there are ways to have them appear as local drives (which I hear are a pain to deal with).
- bonestamp2 7y ago> Synology has built in tools to mirror to it Yes exactly, this is what I'm using. There is a time machine folder on the NAS, the Synology tool mirrors that encrypted folder to backblaze. I have the backblaze sync set to run at 1am so it's not uploading and affecting my bandwidth while I'm (typically) awake. Yes, my remote backup is up to 24 hours behind my local time machine backup, but this is acceptable to me since it's only for catastrophic recovery.
- sib 7y agoBackblaze does back up (directly-connected) external drives but not NAS.
- sprite 7y agoOne thing to keep in mind with iMessage. Even if you back up locally the receiving party is probably using iCloud. So not sure how much it will really help.
- TruthSHIFT 7y agoHave they updated that page? Backups are the very first thing on the list.
- 0xff00ffee 7y agoRight? I'm so confused now. That link appears to be opposite of the article.
- Aaronn 7y agoThe first list is stuff that is encrypted. Farther down the page is stuff that is end to end encrypted. It’s pretty misleading.