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Hmmm. The only thing I wonder is whether there may be a fundamental architectural issue with their approach to "Flight Computer in command". From my understand
by salawat 7y ago
Hmmm. The only thing I wonder is whether there may be a fundamental architectural issue with their approach to "Flight Computer in command".
From my understanding, every 737 has two flight computers, but only one is in command at a time (I.e. generating commands to drive things like A/P, A/T). If other hardware in the plane is connection-wise split between the two computers, you will end up in situations where the two computers fundamentally disagree on what reality is.
The only backup in that case is good airmanship to know that you are in an anomalous condition, diagnose whether you have a set of gauges that you can rely on, and finally, what to do about it. ATC could have been utilized to cross-check instruments.
This is honestly non-trivial machine operation 101. Your sensors can be wrong.
A resolution I might suggest moving forward is an MFD function that allows pilots to manually remap avionics data sources in flight. Structure it as a Source->Sink system. Then again, I'm reluctant to drop that type of burden on them as it sounds quite similar to the structure of certain other software of I'll-repute; however, it would provide a remediatory mechanism a Pilot could utilize in flight.
Though it doesn't help at all if everything is hosed. That's what A/T A/P disconnect and stick and rudder skills are for though.
Overall, it does strike me as possibly being same in type in terms of manufacturer philosophy playing a part; but in this case there was enough done wrong by the pilotsthat it doesn't necessarily seem like a worthwhile hill to die on to go after Boeing for it.
Interesting there was explicit pressure against doing so though. That raises questions, but sufficient time has gone by that likely most documentation to be investigated is long gone.