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It's a great article. But it's a bit more philosophical than practical, and I particularly take issue with the author's use of the term "statistical myth". Nea
by yummyfajitas 16y ago
It's a great article. But it's a bit more philosophical than practical, and I particularly take issue with the author's use of the term "statistical myth".
Near as I can tell, Thompson's model is the following: there are lots of abilities, and any test uses many (232+) of them at random. Individuals have a random selection of abilities.The author then declares that any individual ability is not g, since no specific ability describes performance very well. All very true.
But there is a single, explanatory variable in this model: g = # of abilities an individual has [1]! Moreover, Thompson's model makes a specific prediction about g - it should be normally distributed. So overall, I agree with the author's scientific argument: g is very likely to be decomposable into subfactors.
But I don't agree with his claim that g is a "statistical myth". Let me give an argument illustrating the fallacy he is making. Suppose I want to explain the thermodynamic law PV=nT. I can build a moderately more complicated statistical model [2] involving only 10^23 newtonian particles, with normally distributed velocities, and completely reproduce all the predictions of the thermodynamics. But not a single one of those particle positions explains pressure or temperature! Thus, thermodynamics is just a statistical myth.
Thermodynamics and g are simplified models of the world, based on the fact that the macroscale is dependent primarily on the sum of a large number of microscale variables [1]. They both have decent, though imperfect, predictive power. There is almost certainly a more complicated underlying theory, which will reproduce thermo/g as theorems about statistical aggregates. (For example, g may eventually be explained as the interaction of neurons.) Does this make them "statistical myths"? Of course not. Just macroscale models which have an underlying microscale explanation.
[1] Or perhaps a weighted average based on how frequently abilities are used in tests.
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_mechanics http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_mechanics
[3] For example, pressure is the the average force imparted by particles colliding with the side of a vessel divided by the area on which the collisions occur.
- Symmetry 16y agoThe authors viewpoint seems to be that things that can be directly measured do exist. So I would think that the author would be find with talking about temperature the same way he's ok with talking about IQ ("That thing that IQ tests measure"). I would agree with you personally, and say that really any measurement involves some implicit figuring so there really isn't any difference between IQ and T.
- Dn_Ab 16y agoA flaw with your argument is that biology is harder than physics. That is, the interactions of the elementary constituents of biology are many orders of magnitude vastly more complex than those of the point particles found in newtonian physics. Which makes sense considering the compositional hierarchy involved from atom -> cells -> humans. Hence reductionists statistical methods are likely to be far less useful/meaningful than in thermodynamics.
- Dn_Ab 16y agoI do not care about the downvoting. But I am guessing it is due to my saying that biology is harder than physics [1]. Perhaps I should clarify to say that a broad mathematical understanding of biology is a harder problem than doing so for your typical system studied in physics. In biology, systems can only be modeled and not understood or derived from fundemental principles, as the interactions of the basic entities are too complex. Or consider: Quantum mechanics, it is a straight forward linear theory (just conceptually difficult) while much of biology is analytically and computationally hard, often involving things like non-linear dynamical systems. A further difficulty here is that the behaviour of the whole of the things studied in biology cannot be inferred by studying its constituents - due to feedback-dissipation processes leading to self organization. While I am clarifying, I might as well point out that while I personally believe that the usefulness for looking for broad general factors is meaningless considering the dimensions in consideration, there might be some use for them in aggregrate. However, these should not be taken for more than they are. Statistics. Furthermore, You, yummyfajitas, argue agianst a strawman. Did you read the article? Because if you did you would have seen: I don't want to be mis-understood as being on some positivist-behaviorist crusade against inferences to latent mental variables or structures. As I said, my deepest research interest is, exactly, how to reconstruct hidden causal structures from data. ... Similarly, pointing out that factor analysis and related techniques are unreliable guides to causal structure does not establish the non-existence of a one-dimensional latent variable driving the success of almost all human mental performance. It's possible that there is such a thing. But the major supposed evidence for it is irrelevant, and it accords very badly with what we actually know about the functioning of the brain and the mind. Which leads me to the fact that Shalizi has no qualm against dimensionality reduction. Instead he is against the methodologies used and how the conclusions are drawn: 1) g is almost a tautology. It is due to the correlations in the tests which are made to correlate. When performing such factor analysis on these variables a dominating factor which most explains their variance must appear due to algebraic reasons. 2) No one has tried to explained g directly, experimentally or otherwise. Instead they still argue in terms of correlations. 3) They still use simple correlation matrices - linear models from yestercentury. Other more appropriate or robust methods such as non-parametric statistics have since been refined or developed. [1] http://metabolism.math.duke.edu/docs/04whyams.pdf http://metabolism.math.duke.edu/docs/04whyams.pdf
- deleted 16y ago[deleted]
- bambax 16y agoI think what the author means is that g is a statistical necessity, and that being such, doesn't imply that it's an actual reality. What you seem to be saying is that, in any case, g is a useful proxy for a reality that is difficult to know in detail. This doesn't contradict the author's thesis. The question remains, does g exist beyond arithmetics, is there such a thing as "general intelligence". Maybe it's a useless question, in that we don't need to know whether g "exists": we only need to know that it works. But there is a big difference between intelligence and thermodynamics: policies are implemented that impact the lives of millions of people based on an understanding of g that may be completely false. If g is only a statistical artifact and nothing more, then it's still useful for statisticians, but for policy makers, the underlying factors need to be identified and understood.
- yummyfajitas 16y agoThat's why I object to the term "statistical myth" - it implies the measure is not useful in cases when it is. If g is a useful proxy, it's useful for policy makers. All they need to know is that low T implies dead homeless, and low g implies a higher probability of unskilled employment. The fact that g is actually a sum of independent variables, or T is a sum of squares of velocities of particles is irrelevant to them.
- bambax 16y agoReading the original article further I understand more of what the author meant -- and I agree with him more. What he means by "statistical myth", I think, is that you can throw any number of measurements into a big bag, even weakly correlated, and you'll always be able to find a general macro-factor that is correlated with all of them and therefore seems to "describe the bag" pretty well... even if the bag itself is absolutely meaningless. For example, one could throw into the bag height, sexiness, feet length, and BMI, which are all somewhat correlated with one another and with "IQ". There is a macro factor describing such a bag; but would you call it "general intelligence"? The fact that we talk about g is because we consider a priori that there actually is such a thing as "general intelligence" and that we are measuring elements of it. Maybe we are, maybe we're not; correlations alone tell us nothing about it. The analogy with physics, be it temperature or pressure or what have you, is in my opinion quite flawed, because in the case of those entities we know that the elementary events / forces are linked by way of causality with the macro factor, and we know that for reasons other than mere correlation. In the case of g, on the contrary, the only link between the different elements is the correlation itself. And it gets worse: to be included as a relevant IQ test, a new test has to be correlated with g. To quote from the article: "By this point, I'd guess it's impossible for something to become accepted as an "intelligence test" if it doesn't correlate well with the Weschler and its kin, no matter how much intelligence, in the ordinary sense, it requires. (...) This is circular and self-confirming, and the real surprise is that it doesn't work better." So g is at the same time what we're looking for and what we're building upon, having decided it's there already. This looks much more like religion than science.
- Dn_Ab 16y agoYes! This is what I am trying to say but in a much more muddled and round about way.
- yummyfajitas 16y agoFor example, one could throw into the bag height, sexiness, feet length, and BMI, which are all somewhat correlated with one another and with "IQ". The point is that if those phenomena are all correlated with one another, there is likely to be an underlying reason for that. Maybe it's not general intelligence, but there is something. Suppose you threw a different set of things into the bag: phase of the moon at birth, whether you were bitten by a wolf, and how good you are with computers. These things almost certainly will not be correlated, because there is indeed no relationship between them. The only reason the author discovered a large principal component in all his models is because he explicitly built one in! Now, my analogy with physics is not to the physics of today. Rather, it's to physics pre-Boltzman. Before that, we didn't really know how the atomic theory of physics was related to thermodynamics. All we really had were correlations - boiling is correlated with burning, with faster chemical reactions, expansion of solids, with the human perception of warmth, etc. We observed they all occurred together, and postulated an underlying variable T which correlated well with all of them. We then exploited the correlation between this hidden variable T and thermal expansion to design a specific test to measure it (thermometers). Pre-Boltzman, all we had were correlations between fundamentally different physical phenomena. We had various incorrect theories about why some of them occurred together, but that's about it. Now suppose Boltzman comes along. He says "what you call a single variable T, I can explain with the sum of many variables." Does that mean it's reasonable to conclude T is a "statistical myth"?