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Boeing’s Responsibility in a Deadly Crash ‘Got Buried’

54 points by mhb 7y ago

chmaynard 7y ago
The Boeing CEO at the time was James McNerney. As Boeing's first CEO without a background in aviation, he made the decision to upgrade the 737 series to 737 MAX instead of developing a new model. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_McNerney https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_McNerney
- stopads 7y ago
  I think we should add a new stat for C-level execs on financial websites, in addition to compensation and tenure and whatnot we should have a "body count" number listed. Maybe add this to crunchbase as well?
  - chmaynard 7y ago
    I think you're referring to external body count. We should also include their internal count -- how many bodies they climbed over on the way to the top.
heisenbit 7y ago
Very interesting. Another failure mode with single sensor, overacting computer and similar Boing behavior. In a way the 2009 crash and the regulator and Boing behavior laid the foundation for the Max crashes. It may be a good idea to look at any other crashes the last decade where ‚pilot error‘ was the prime reason.
- stefan_ 7y ago
  In particular, another failure where systems used random sensors. If you have critical system A using sensor A and critical system B using sensor B exclusively, great, you have now doubled the chance that a sensor failure will impact a critical system. It was even more idiotic with the MCAS system that would apparently pick a random sensor on every flight and then use that exclusively, which is of course strictly worse than just having one sensor to begin with.
luminaobscura 7y ago
"Even a fix now proposed for the Max has similarities with the past: After the crash near Amsterdam, the F.A.A. required airlines to install a software update for the NG that compared data from the plane’s two sensors, rather than relying on just one. The software change Boeing has developed for the Max also compares data from two sensors. Critically, in the case of the NG, Boeing had already developed the software fix well before the Turkish Airlines crash, including it on new planes starting in 2006 and offering it as an optional update on hundreds of other aircraft. But for some older jets, including the one that crashed near Amsterdam, the update wouldn’t work, and Boeing did not develop a compatible version until after the accident."

54 points by mhb 7y ago

The Boeing CEO at the time was James McNerney. As Boeing's first CEO without a background in aviation, he made the decision to upgrade the 737 series to 737 MAX instead of developing a new model. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_McNerney https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_McNerney

stopads 7y ago
I think we should add a new stat for C-level execs on financial websites, in addition to compensation and tenure and whatnot we should have a "body count" number listed. Maybe add this to crunchbase as well?
- chmaynard 7y ago
  I think you're referring to external body count. We should also include their internal count -- how many bodies they climbed over on the way to the top.

heisenbit 7y ago

Very interesting. Another failure mode with single sensor, overacting computer and similar Boing behavior. In a way the 2009 crash and the regulator and Boing behavior laid the foundation for the Max crashes. It may be a good idea to look at any other crashes the last decade where ‚pilot error‘ was the prime reason.

stefan_ 7y ago
In particular, another failure where systems used random sensors. If you have critical system A using sensor A and critical system B using sensor B exclusively, great, you have now doubled the chance that a sensor failure will impact a critical system. It was even more idiotic with the MCAS system that would apparently pick a random sensor on every flight and then use that exclusively, which is of course strictly worse than just having one sensor to begin with.

luminaobscura 7y ago

"Even a fix now proposed for the Max has similarities with the past: After the crash near Amsterdam, the F.A.A. required airlines to install a software update for the NG that compared data from the plane’s two sensors, rather than relying on just one. The software change Boeing has developed for the Max also compares data from two sensors. Critically, in the case of the NG, Boeing had already developed the software fix well before the Turkish Airlines crash, including it on new planes starting in 2006 and offering it as an optional update on hundreds of other aircraft. But for some older jets, including the one that crashed near Amsterdam, the update wouldn’t work, and Boeing did not develop a compatible version until after the accident."