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This is more and more starting to smell a bit like this is the first time in a while when somebody is actually looking whether a plane fulfills the regulations.

This is more and more starting to smell a bit like this is the first time in a while when somebody is actually looking whether a plane fulfills the regulations. Just wonder if FAA & co should actually audit some other models as well with same level of scrutiny? And by all means not just Boeing.

amiga_500 7y ago
Just American manufacturers as a priority as this is clearly where the revolving door is.
ulfw 7y ago
If they'd ever audit (and let alone certify without outsourcing it to the very manufacturer) the 787, it won't be pretty for Boeing.
- jsjohnst 7y ago
  Being the 787 was a new type rating at the time of its release and its release happened before many of the major cutbacks in the FAA, I’m not sure that’s a fair statement. Do you have a source to back that up?
  - ulfw 7y ago
    To back what up? That Boeing self-certified on the 787 too? The whole “Boeing verifies itself and creates shoddy products” came out in 2013 already. Nothing ever improved since. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-hearing/boeing-faa-defend-approval-of-787-dreamliner-idUSBRE95B0P720130612 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-hearing/boeing-faa...
Waterluvian 7y ago
How many new planes are designed each year that the FAA needed to abdicate this responsibility? Aren't planes hard and basically there's only a few new major models in a year?
- mannykannot 7y ago
  Two words: regulatory capture. I very much doubt that the career engineers and administrators at the FAA chose to abdicate the responsibility, but there are all sorts of ways that politicians and their appointees at the top can bring this about without an explicit policy: reducing headcount and reassigning staff, rewriting the low-level rules and guidelines, burying the staff in paperwork and meetings... Boeing can also subvert the process by disputing every point, administrative burying, and by concealing things (such as the increase in MCAS' power to change the trim after the initial version was found to be ineffective.)
- jsjohnst 7y ago
  > basically there's only a few new major models in a year? Depends on how you define major, but there’s really only a few new major models a decade. Even if you count things like 787-800, 787-900, etc variations as major, there’s still not a few models every year even if you include all major commercial aircraft manufacturers.
- kayfox 7y ago
  There's a steady stream of airworthiness directives from plane manufacturers. Old parts get discontinued, new parts have to be used, issues are found and corrected, more inspection is needed, sometimes less inspection is needed. More training, different training, etc.
labcomputer 7y ago
> This is more and more starting to smell a bit like this is the first time in a while when somebody is actually looking whether a plane fulfills the regulation Of course it is. That's the whole point of MCAS, limited pilot training, and the rest of Boeing's "strange" design decisions to make the Max seem like a minor update. Let me state this explicitly: The 737 does not meet current FAR part 25 standards. It did meet part 25 standards at the time the type certificate was issued 50+ years ago, but the standards have changed. So how was the Max certified? Well, the FAA awarded Boeing an "amended type certificate" (that's a term of art) for the 737 Max, which means that it is certified on the basis of being a variant of the original 737-100 that flew in 1967. That means aircraft systems can be grandfathered in, even if they don't meet current standards. Many of the 737's systems would need to be extensively redesigned in order to pass muster for a new type certificate. Boeing did everything they could to avoid a new type certificate for the Max, so as to avoid redesigning the entire plane. Fun fact: Every Boeing 717 still has a placard near the main front entry door that proudly announces its Douglas DC-9 type certificate (from two corporate mergers ago).
- jdc 7y ago
  Isn't this (grandfathering tactic) gaming the system? Like borderline fraud?
  - bdavis__ 7y ago
    fraud, maybe not. bad idea, maybe. the idea was that a lot of effort and money was spent certifying a plane, and it makes sense to allow delta changes to the design without revisiting the entire process. so a plane is in service and customers want it to fly a longer distance. the oem makes them a configuration that has more fuel tanks, and less seats. the delta change has to be evaluated against the original certification, because it is possible that meeting current rules is impossible without major rework (think how wiring is done, the kind of hydraulic fittings allowed, things that are everywhere. it allows the economic life of the design and the investment of end users (airlines) to be protected with some semblance of regulation.
- rasz 7y ago

amiga_500 7y ago

Just American manufacturers as a priority as this is clearly where the revolving door is.

ulfw 7y ago

If they'd ever audit (and let alone certify without outsourcing it to the very manufacturer) the 787, it won't be pretty for Boeing.

jsjohnst 7y ago
Being the 787 was a new type rating at the time of its release and its release happened before many of the major cutbacks in the FAA, I’m not sure that’s a fair statement. Do you have a source to back that up?
- ulfw 7y ago
  To back what up? That Boeing self-certified on the 787 too? The whole “Boeing verifies itself and creates shoddy products” came out in 2013 already. Nothing ever improved since. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-hearing/boeing-faa-defend-approval-of-787-dreamliner-idUSBRE95B0P720130612 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-hearing/boeing-faa...

Waterluvian 7y ago

How many new planes are designed each year that the FAA needed to abdicate this responsibility? Aren't planes hard and basically there's only a few new major models in a year?

mannykannot 7y ago
Two words: regulatory capture. I very much doubt that the career engineers and administrators at the FAA chose to abdicate the responsibility, but there are all sorts of ways that politicians and their appointees at the top can bring this about without an explicit policy: reducing headcount and reassigning staff, rewriting the low-level rules and guidelines, burying the staff in paperwork and meetings... Boeing can also subvert the process by disputing every point, administrative burying, and by concealing things (such as the increase in MCAS' power to change the trim after the initial version was found to be ineffective.)
jsjohnst 7y ago
> basically there's only a few new major models in a year? Depends on how you define major, but there’s really only a few new major models a decade. Even if you count things like 787-800, 787-900, etc variations as major, there’s still not a few models every year even if you include all major commercial aircraft manufacturers.
kayfox 7y ago
There's a steady stream of airworthiness directives from plane manufacturers. Old parts get discontinued, new parts have to be used, issues are found and corrected, more inspection is needed, sometimes less inspection is needed. More training, different training, etc.

labcomputer 7y ago

> This is more and more starting to smell a bit like this is the first time in a while when somebody is actually looking whether a plane fulfills the regulation Of course it is. That's the whole point of MCAS, limited pilot training, and the rest of Boeing's "strange" design decisions to make the Max seem like a minor update. Let me state this explicitly: The 737 does not meet current FAR part 25 standards. It did meet part 25 standards at the time the type certificate was issued 50+ years ago, but the standards have changed. So how was the Max certified? Well, the FAA awarded Boeing an "amended type certificate" (that's a term of art) for the 737 Max, which means that it is certified on the basis of being a variant of the original 737-100 that flew in 1967. That means aircraft systems can be grandfathered in, even if they don't meet current standards. Many of the 737's systems would need to be extensively redesigned in order to pass muster for a new type certificate. Boeing did everything they could to avoid a new type certificate for the Max, so as to avoid redesigning the entire plane. Fun fact: Every Boeing 717 still has a placard near the main front entry door that proudly announces its Douglas DC-9 type certificate (from two corporate mergers ago).

jdc 7y ago
Isn't this (grandfathering tactic) gaming the system? Like borderline fraud?
- bdavis__ 7y ago
  fraud, maybe not. bad idea, maybe. the idea was that a lot of effort and money was spent certifying a plane, and it makes sense to allow delta changes to the design without revisiting the entire process. so a plane is in service and customers want it to fly a longer distance. the oem makes them a configuration that has more fuel tanks, and less seats. the delta change has to be evaluated against the original certification, because it is possible that meeting current rules is impossible without major rework (think how wiring is done, the kind of hydraulic fittings allowed, things that are everywhere. it allows the economic life of the design and the investment of end users (airlines) to be protected with some semblance of regulation.
rasz 7y ago