3 ms·

> Consider what 'ourselves' (i.e. life, consciousness) are - something that's by definition not possible to describe with 'physics' because we've ruled it out (

> Consider what 'ourselves' (i.e. life, consciousness) are - something that's by definition not possible to describe with 'physics' because we've ruled it out (energy and matter acting according to rules cannot be 'aware' or 'conscious'). I’m not sure I follow.

claudiawerner 7y ago
I think GP is referring to the idea that there is no yet identified physical mechanism that identifies the arising of consciousness in terms of properties of matter or energy, to which (if I understand GP correctly) physics restricts itself to. Leibniz put the objection to the mechanical materialist conception of consciousness/perception in 1714: >One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception.
- MacsHeadroom 7y ago
  Physicalism and materialism aren't remotely equivalent. I see people making this mistake too often. The dominant theory of consciousness in physics, neuroscience, neuro-physics (no surprise) and philosophy today is that conscious experience is the real intrinsic perspective of matter. As such consciousness and all its contents are necessarily subjective, qualitative, and not reducible to purely quantitative physicalism. Materialism then accounts for both consciousness and meaning (as measure of the significance of experiences relative to other experiences) in a way which physicalism cannot.
- frutiger 7y ago
  > there is no yet identified physical mechanism that identifies the arising of consciousness in terms of properties of matter or energy As far as I know, there's no proper definition of consciousness, and any time we have narrowed what consciousness may be (over the past few centuries) we have redefined consciousness so that it remains indefinable. It seems strange to me to divide the universe into "meat inside bags of skin" and "things outside bags of skin" and presume one side of that split somehow possesses unique properties not subject to physical laws of matter and energy.
jariel 7y ago
Scientific materialism is reductionist - it implies we are random bags noise. You can't have life, love, sorrow, consciousness, wisdom etc. from a bunch of atomic lego blocks working together according to some rules. The very assumption that the universe must be made up of 'laws that act on matter/energy' literally rules out our own existence as sentient beings, because it implies we are just randomness. It's a paradox because most people who use materialism as their default perspective (most of us do, daily), also believe in their own life, will, consciousness. The OP did exactly this: he's describing the objective universe has 'having no meaning' because it's just a bag of noise, but then implying that it does have value 'to us'. Well, 'us' the 'observer' is obviously not accounted for in the materialist, reductionist view, and yet it's there and we all know it. I believe that scientific materialism for this reason, represents a nihilist philosophy, or at least they are closely related.
- boomboomsubban 7y ago
  >You can't have life, love, sorrow, consciousness, wisdom etc. from a bunch of atomic lego blocks working together according to some rules. All of those are ways we have developed to explain the sensations we have experienced according to those rules. We act as though we have free will and consciousness because they are the terms we have developed to describe how we think we act. They can not be described by physics because they were theories developed with very poor data available, not truths that need to be described. >Well, 'us' the 'observer' is obviously not accounted for in the materialist, reductionist view, and yet it's there and we all know it. "Us" is not an independent observer, we are a part of the universe. The universe can give itself as much meaning as it wants, that doesn't create an external meaning to the universe.

claudiawerner 7y ago

I think GP is referring to the idea that there is no yet identified physical mechanism that identifies the arising of consciousness in terms of properties of matter or energy, to which (if I understand GP correctly) physics restricts itself to. Leibniz put the objection to the mechanical materialist conception of consciousness/perception in 1714: >One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception.

MacsHeadroom 7y ago
Physicalism and materialism aren't remotely equivalent. I see people making this mistake too often. The dominant theory of consciousness in physics, neuroscience, neuro-physics (no surprise) and philosophy today is that conscious experience is the real intrinsic perspective of matter. As such consciousness and all its contents are necessarily subjective, qualitative, and not reducible to purely quantitative physicalism. Materialism then accounts for both consciousness and meaning (as measure of the significance of experiences relative to other experiences) in a way which physicalism cannot.
frutiger 7y ago
> there is no yet identified physical mechanism that identifies the arising of consciousness in terms of properties of matter or energy As far as I know, there's no proper definition of consciousness, and any time we have narrowed what consciousness may be (over the past few centuries) we have redefined consciousness so that it remains indefinable. It seems strange to me to divide the universe into "meat inside bags of skin" and "things outside bags of skin" and presume one side of that split somehow possesses unique properties not subject to physical laws of matter and energy.

jariel 7y ago

Scientific materialism is reductionist - it implies we are random bags noise. You can't have life, love, sorrow, consciousness, wisdom etc. from a bunch of atomic lego blocks working together according to some rules. The very assumption that the universe must be made up of 'laws that act on matter/energy' literally rules out our own existence as sentient beings, because it implies we are just randomness. It's a paradox because most people who use materialism as their default perspective (most of us do, daily), also believe in their own life, will, consciousness. The OP did exactly this: he's describing the objective universe has 'having no meaning' because it's just a bag of noise, but then implying that it does have value 'to us'. Well, 'us' the 'observer' is obviously not accounted for in the materialist, reductionist view, and yet it's there and we all know it. I believe that scientific materialism for this reason, represents a nihilist philosophy, or at least they are closely related.

boomboomsubban 7y ago
>You can't have life, love, sorrow, consciousness, wisdom etc. from a bunch of atomic lego blocks working together according to some rules. All of those are ways we have developed to explain the sensations we have experienced according to those rules. We act as though we have free will and consciousness because they are the terms we have developed to describe how we think we act. They can not be described by physics because they were theories developed with very poor data available, not truths that need to be described. >Well, 'us' the 'observer' is obviously not accounted for in the materialist, reductionist view, and yet it's there and we all know it. "Us" is not an independent observer, we are a part of the universe. The universe can give itself as much meaning as it wants, that doesn't create an external meaning to the universe.