There's no reason to expect that your decisions would affect the next Boltzmann brain in the sequence, so there's still no need to put value of the Boltzmann br

There's no reason to expect that your decisions would affect the next Boltzmann brain in the sequence, so there's still no need to put value of the Boltzmann brains' decisions. I don't think it makes sense to put more weight on the specific series of Boltzmann brains where the decisions seem to be followed by a subsequent Boltzmann brain than on the much more likely series of Boltzmann brains that just resemble your mental state but don't have any seemingly-causal relationships between each other. If you're allowed to put more weight on specific extremely-improbable sequences of Boltzmann brains, then you can propose all sorts of nonsense scenarios like "Imagine the series of Boltzmann brains where if one thinks of a purple elephant, then the next Boltzmann brain experiences the subsequent thought but also a lot of pain. Should you avoid thinking of purple elephants because of the fact this unordered sequence will happen eventually in an infinite universe?". I think in order to really reason about this sort of thing, you need to start considering theories of the universe like UDASSA (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20119513 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20119513, http://fennetic.net/irc/finney.org/~hal/udassa/ http://fennetic.net/irc/finney.org/~hal/udassa/), which provides a framework for how we should expect to anticipate different events, and Boltzmann brains and especially specifically-selected sequences of Boltzmann brains have so little measure compared to other things including our human selves that they're not worth considering, even if their decisions actually did have a causal effect on some part of a world (which would also have minuscule measure compared to ours).