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The way that I'm reading the "browse-up" scenario, however, isn't how you're describing it. Admins wouldn't "secure connect to another host"-- they'd have to us
by EvanAnderson 7y ago
The way that I'm reading the "browse-up" scenario, however, isn't how you're describing it. Admins wouldn't "secure connect to another host"-- they'd have to use a trusted and known-clean device to perform all that administrative activities. Connecting to that device from another host (i.e. using it as a "jump box") seems to be specifically disclaimed as an "anti-pattern".
- spydum 7y agoCorrect - the guidance serious shops give is to created privileged access workstations (PAWs) for critically sensitive work (think AD domain admin work or NW engineers, etc). You wouldn't expect most devs to be down in the weeds, but who knows
- theossuary 7y agoThat's not how I read it. This past in particular: > There are many ways in which you can build a browse-down approach. You could use a virtual machine on the administrative device to perform any activities on less trusted systems. The point is to tailor your risk to the systems your accessing. You should interact with less trusted content in more secure ways if you're also interesting with high security systems. So if you're using firejail/bubble wrap to consume less trusted content (web, email, videos, etc.) and selinux/apparmor; I think your system would match their description of browse-down, for most low to mid security systems. For high security maybe Qubes/VMs. Then highest security you start thinking about multiple machines with kvm switches.