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The result with Chrome makes sense and I hadn't thought of that outcome. Let's walk through it for anybody else as slow as I am. You forge a certificate to att
by tialaramex 7y ago
The result with Chrome makes sense and I hadn't thought of that outcome. Let's walk through it for anybody else as slow as I am.
You forge a certificate to attack a Windows victim..
- Chrome uses Windows' broken cert validation when run on Windows. So that passes.
- But then it also checks SCTs. An SCT is a signature from a public Certificate Transparency log saying they've logged this exact certificate and it's available to the public.
You get to pick in your bogus cert from two options
A: Just use SCTs from some other certificate which was logged. Chrome (not Windows) checks the signatures and they don't match so your certificate is rejected.
B: Try to log your bogus certificate to obtain an SCT. But the log checks certificate signatures and isn't running Windows, so it rejects the attempt.
The SCTs needn't be baked into a certificate (if you're a random server operator yours probably are, but for some applications the extra work to do it another way was worth it) but that doesn't help an attacker because they can't get a valid SCT for their bogus certificate.
Updated with: Things that might work
Google only made logging mandatory for new certificates from April 2018. A February 2018 certificate could have the old maximum lifetime (39 months) and be exempt from the SCT requirement. So I think a forged cert which claims notBefore 2018-02-27 and notAfter 2021-04-01 or whatever would work with no SCTs inside it, against unpatched Windows systems.
Certificates which aren't from the Web PKI skip the SCT check. So if you have a company CA which does ECC then a certificate could be forged from that CA and used to attack you in Chrome because the SCT checks don't fire.