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It's important to think that the moral critique of video games isn't the only one around; it's possible to think that it's moral to play video games[0] but that

It's important to think that the moral critique of video games isn't the only one around; it's possible to think that it's moral to play video games[0] but that they have a much lower aesthetic value (inherently or on average) than other artforms. [0] The moral status of people who play games involving killing, rape, etc. may seem irrelevant, but there's a paper I read a while ago[1] which argues that under a deontological system, playing such games may be immoral because of their content - a pro tanto wrong. I suppose the argument has less weight as most lay people are consequentialists or moral relativsits. [1] "This paper is concerned with whether there is a moral difference between simulating wrongdoing and consuming non-simulatory representations of wrongdoing. I argue that simulating wrongdoing is (as such) a pro tanto wrong whose wrongness does not tarnish other cases of consuming representations of wrongdoing. While simulating wrongdoing (as such) constitutes a disrespectful act, consuming representations of wrongdoing (as such) does not." https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10676-018-9463-7 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10676-018-9463-7

nl 7y ago
I don't find video games "less" in anyway, aesthetic or otherwise. The moral argument you point to there seems limited to violent FPS-style games - unless you consider Chess to be deontologically questionable (and surely these concerns are increased in games like poker, where bluffing (lying) to other humans is part of the game). It's an interesting intellectual argument, but not particularly relevant to my point.
dragonwriter 7y ago
> but there's a paper I read a while ago[1] which argues that under a deontological system, playing such games may be immoral because of their content - a pro tanto wrong. I think even most deontologists would consider the deontological status of participation in a game depicting/simulating certain subject matter as at least sometimes significantly different from the deontological status of actually participating in the act, a distinction similar to use/mention distinctions. Sure, a set of moral axioms on which those are categorically equivalent is possible, but I don't think it's common even among deontological frameworks that don't reduce to consequentialism.
- claudiawerner 7y ago
  >at least sometimes significantly different from the deontological status of actually participating in the act, a distinction similar to use/mention distinctions. True, that's as much as the paper argues, too. My point wasn't that most deontologists would consider it immoral, only that someone has argued (quite convincingly) that it can be.

nl 7y ago

I don't find video games "less" in anyway, aesthetic or otherwise. The moral argument you point to there seems limited to violent FPS-style games - unless you consider Chess to be deontologically questionable (and surely these concerns are increased in games like poker, where bluffing (lying) to other humans is part of the game). It's an interesting intellectual argument, but not particularly relevant to my point.

dragonwriter 7y ago

> but there's a paper I read a while ago[1] which argues that under a deontological system, playing such games may be immoral because of their content - a pro tanto wrong. I think even most deontologists would consider the deontological status of participation in a game depicting/simulating certain subject matter as at least sometimes significantly different from the deontological status of actually participating in the act, a distinction similar to use/mention distinctions. Sure, a set of moral axioms on which those are categorically equivalent is possible, but I don't think it's common even among deontological frameworks that don't reduce to consequentialism.

claudiawerner 7y ago
>at least sometimes significantly different from the deontological status of actually participating in the act, a distinction similar to use/mention distinctions. True, that's as much as the paper argues, too. My point wasn't that most deontologists would consider it immoral, only that someone has argued (quite convincingly) that it can be.