Do you intuit - or think - or whatever - as a neuroscientist - that speed of this "swapping" matters? What about "swapping" one-by-one vs all-at-once? Would th

Do you intuit - or think - or whatever - as a neuroscientist - that speed of this "swapping" matters? What about "swapping" one-by-one vs all-at-once? Would that matter? What I'm getting at - which is where things seem to go sideways to think about it - is that if you did this swap - but rather the artificial neurons remain outside the body, and you did it near-instantly (vs slowly one-by-one) - and I am speaking of relative speeds here; say "near-instantly" means the entire swap takes one second, vs the slower manner of each swap taking a millisecond (or whatever). Would that matter? Now - what if instead of swapping - you did a parallel simulation instead - one-by-one, recreating the brain, but the artificial version operating in lockstep with the original; when one neuron "fires" the same artificial neuron "fires", same "paths" taken, etc. Then you kill (choose your method and make it quick) the natural brain - instant swap? Or is there something different? Where does the "consciousness" go? If it is different, why is it any different than the "near-instant" swap? Why would making that "lockstep-copy" matter, vs not making a "copy"? I think you get what I am saying. Think on it a bit. There isn't a good answer that I am aware of. Note: I'm assuming an "instant kill" - death to the natural brain faster than neural signals can travel neuron-to-neuron, ideally. We can posit the idea that if it were any slower (and especially if it were really slow) that the two brains would diverge in experiences, and would become two different "consciousnesses". But it does make you wonder why this should happen with a copy, vs not (in theory?) with a one-by-one swap. Heck - maybe there's an answer in there somewhere...