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> Our own experience of our consciousness is as much an illusions as our experience of the world. When we consider and attempt to discuss our own experience of
by memling 7y ago
> Our own experience of our consciousness is as much an illusions as our experience of the world. When we consider and attempt to discuss our own experience of redness, we are generally left with only our memory of that experience which influenced be a great deal of post-processing, compression and abstraction. I believe the mental states in which you can actually experience pure redness is very different from the state in which you can attempt analyze and discuss that experience.
How do you know that your experimentation that reveals this disconnect isn't subject to the same problem?
I'm not sure how to word it artfully, but I mean the question sincerely: how do we avoid invoking turtles-all-the-down?
- shkkmo 7y agoTo abuse that analogy, it's turtles all the way down until eventually it's not turtles but the border where that transition happens is blurry because "Turtle" is just an artificial human created category. Like the "chicken and the egg" paradox, reality is most likely that things change a little with each step until the category "chicken" eventually doesn't apply. I do think that, like with our perception of color, there are likely fairly concrete inaccuracies in our memories of our experience of consciousness that we might be able to measure that might improve our understanding of the underlying phenomenon with fully explaining it.