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That only works if neurons do generate consciousness. The only thing we know is that their activity seems to correlate with consciousness. My guess is that you

That only works if neurons do generate consciousness. The only thing we know is that their activity seems to correlate with consciousness. My guess is that you can't build a digital Neuron, at least not one that has consciousness properties. That's because I take neurons to be what consciousness looks like when viewed through our senses.

hackinthebochs 7y ago
But what's special about neurons aside from the causal relationships it has with the rest of the system? If its utility to consciousness is nothing but its causal relationships then a digital replica will support consciousness just the same.
- arnoooooo 7y ago
  "nothing but causal relationships" is indeed all you'd need, provided they go the materialist way, i.e. that consciousness comes from specific arrangements of neurons. I don't think that makes sense, as nobody can give the slightest hint of a theory that would make that work. The reverse theory, that consciousness is primary, makes more sense to me. In that theory, the causality works the other way, and digital replicas will not have consciousness, they will be a mirror of what consciousness looks like when seen through our senses.
  - balfirevic 7y ago
    > and digital replicas will not have consciousness They will also go on internet forums arguing that while they, of course, do have consciousness - the digital replicas of themselves would not!
  - n4r9 7y ago
    > I don't think that makes sense, as nobody can give the slightest hint of a theory that would make that work I'm not sure what could possibly answer this problem, at least to the satisfaction of the people who think it is a problem. Personally, I'm relatively happy that Daniel Dennett's ideas demonstrate how what we think of as consciousness, qualia etc can be explained via mechanistic/algorithmic processes.
  - hackinthebochs 7y ago
    >In that theory, the causality works the other way, and digital replicas will not have consciousness Why not? Digital stuff is made up of matter as well. Unless there's something special about neurons when it comes to consciousness, i.e. the conscious bits reside in neurons and nowhere else for some reason, there's reason to think non-biological structures that produce the same output would also be conscious. Any substantive theory of consciousness, materialist or not, will need to include a place for structure and dynamics, i.e. information cascades, within their theory to account for the correlations we observe between conscious states and brain structure and dynamics. But these qualities are present in a digital implementation as well.
mannykannot 7y ago
A transistor junction does not have computational properties; it is only in aggregate that they can make a computer. Supposing that the mind is the result of neurons' inherent consciousness properties is like attributing morphine's effect as arising from its "dormitive virtue" - it does not advance our understanding.
- SubiculumCode 7y ago
  Neurons are much more complicated that that, and indeed may do computations on their own.
  - mannykannot 7y ago
    I am not sure of the relevance of that here, especially as the issue is not whether a computer could be made from neurons. My point is that the premise, that the mind is a result of neurons interacting, is not predicated on a requirement that each individual neuron has 'consciousness properties', whatever they might be. I cannot see how the computational abilities of neurons invalidates my analogy to silicon computers, where the computational properties are only found in aggregations of the basic building blocks, and not in the basic blocks themselves. Also, it seems quite plausible that an aggregation of semiconductor junctions could have the same computational abilities as a neuron. This is, in fact, an active area of R&D.

hackinthebochs 7y ago

But what's special about neurons aside from the causal relationships it has with the rest of the system? If its utility to consciousness is nothing but its causal relationships then a digital replica will support consciousness just the same.

arnoooooo 7y ago
"nothing but causal relationships" is indeed all you'd need, provided they go the materialist way, i.e. that consciousness comes from specific arrangements of neurons. I don't think that makes sense, as nobody can give the slightest hint of a theory that would make that work. The reverse theory, that consciousness is primary, makes more sense to me. In that theory, the causality works the other way, and digital replicas will not have consciousness, they will be a mirror of what consciousness looks like when seen through our senses.
- balfirevic 7y ago
  > and digital replicas will not have consciousness They will also go on internet forums arguing that while they, of course, do have consciousness - the digital replicas of themselves would not!
- n4r9 7y ago
  > I don't think that makes sense, as nobody can give the slightest hint of a theory that would make that work I'm not sure what could possibly answer this problem, at least to the satisfaction of the people who think it is a problem. Personally, I'm relatively happy that Daniel Dennett's ideas demonstrate how what we think of as consciousness, qualia etc can be explained via mechanistic/algorithmic processes.
- hackinthebochs 7y ago
  >In that theory, the causality works the other way, and digital replicas will not have consciousness Why not? Digital stuff is made up of matter as well. Unless there's something special about neurons when it comes to consciousness, i.e. the conscious bits reside in neurons and nowhere else for some reason, there's reason to think non-biological structures that produce the same output would also be conscious. Any substantive theory of consciousness, materialist or not, will need to include a place for structure and dynamics, i.e. information cascades, within their theory to account for the correlations we observe between conscious states and brain structure and dynamics. But these qualities are present in a digital implementation as well.

mannykannot 7y ago

A transistor junction does not have computational properties; it is only in aggregate that they can make a computer. Supposing that the mind is the result of neurons' inherent consciousness properties is like attributing morphine's effect as arising from its "dormitive virtue" - it does not advance our understanding.

SubiculumCode 7y ago
Neurons are much more complicated that that, and indeed may do computations on their own.
- mannykannot 7y ago
  I am not sure of the relevance of that here, especially as the issue is not whether a computer could be made from neurons. My point is that the premise, that the mind is a result of neurons interacting, is not predicated on a requirement that each individual neuron has 'consciousness properties', whatever they might be. I cannot see how the computational abilities of neurons invalidates my analogy to silicon computers, where the computational properties are only found in aggregations of the basic building blocks, and not in the basic blocks themselves. Also, it seems quite plausible that an aggregation of semiconductor junctions could have the same computational abilities as a neuron. This is, in fact, an active area of R&D.