I'm pretty sure that's the argument I'm making? 1. consciousness isn't fundamental, it's a consequence of normal physics 2. because it's not fundamental the d

I'm pretty sure that's the argument I'm making? 1. consciousness isn't fundamental, it's a consequence of normal physics 2. because it's not fundamental the definitions will always be arbitrary, just like with any other emergent phenomena (when does fog stop and rain start? At which height does atmosphere end? What is a planet)? All just labels and arbitrary thresholds slapped on some consequences of laws of physics. > it is an extremely delicate position with also a lot of handwavimg and question marks At least i'm not making untestable assumptions. If we can make a perfect copy of a brain and it doesn't work then I'm wrong. I prefer my theories to be delicate - that means they can be disproven. The alternative is "because magic".