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Am I the only one who thinks the consciousness question is really quite easy to understand and answer? The illusion of consciousness is obviously beneficial. F

by kypro 7y ago

Am I the only one who thinks the consciousness question is really quite easy to understand and answer? The illusion of consciousness is obviously beneficial. For example, I could tell a computer, through the use of sensors, to report that it's in pain when it's hit. But you wouldn't take it seriously, or care for its suffering, because it hasn't also declared that it is under the illusion that its suffering has a kind of physical manifestation in its mind. The reason we care more about animals today than in the past is because we finally began to question whether or not they had a similar sense of self as us - perhaps when we are cruel to animals they don't just know they're in pain and understand like a computer might that pain is bad, but their brains actually tell them they are physically feeling a sensation of pain. Similarly, I presume if an AI ever said it had a similar physical experience of pain to us then we would considering treating that AI with similar regard to that of a human. If I'm correct, then an illusion of consciousness makes complete evolutionary sense. It's not really consciousness, but a sense of self, and more importantly, a sense that there are others with a similar sense of self to our own. Our consciousness is just our brains saying you're a real thing that thinks and feels. It's a lie our brain tells us that our pain and the pain of others is important and worth caring about.

danharaj 7y ago
How do you define an illusion without first positing a being that can experience (hence conscious) an illusion? What does it mean that consciousness is a 'lie our brain tells us', who are we? Are you assuming some form of cartesian dualism, or perhaps you are making a sort of homunculus argument? [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument
- sebastianconcpt 7y ago
  Right, the illusion hypothesis isn't consistent and also can't explain Qualia.
- kypro 7y ago
  By illusion I just mean there isn't really a physical pain (sub atomic elements don't feel pain) but our brains still act as if we experience pain from the perspective of a self. From this perspective the self is a real thing, you are a conscious human, not a collection of atoms - you matter more than your matter. Let me try this another way... Imagine an identical universe with one difference - no one is conscious. If I decide to kill in this hypothetical universe is it wrong? And even if you say yes, is it equally as wrong as in a universe with conscious beings? This is the explanation for consciousness and why the illusion is important. We think we're aware of our senses and in control of our actions, but we know we're not. We know what we consciously obverse is different from the input we get from our sensory organs - which is the reason things like optical illusions exist. We also know that we subconsciously make our decisions a fraction of second before we're consciously aware of them. In my opinion this all points towards consciousness being an illusion, rather than an actual awareness of self.
  - SamBam 7y ago
    > but our brains still act as if we experience pain That's fine for someone else's brain -- I can see it act as if a person is experiencing pain -- but I know that I experience pain. I'm not just going through the motions, I experience it. Again, your argument is a homunculus argument -- that your brain is lying/whatever for the benefit of something else inside that is experiencing the "illusion" of consciousness. Again, you can't have an illusion of consciousness, because an "illusion" requires consciousness.
    - kypro 7y ago
      > I know that I experience pain I accept you perceive pain in the context of a self. > you can't have an illusion of consciousness, because an "illusion" requires consciousness. I think this might be the core of our disagreement. I don't know why you think that? An illusion is just a false perception of reality so it doesn't technically require consciousness - but I think I know what you're getting at. Imagine a computer which can "see" its surroundings through a camera. Why couldn't I program this computer to think it's conscious and to experience its visual data in the context of a self? That's what I honestly think we're doing and what you're describing when you talk about consciousness. I don't know why the experience you're calling consciousness can't just be explained more easily by your brain processing sensory inputs in the context of a self. I understand to you this feels like a special thing, but from a physical perspective I honestly don't know what you're describing that couldn't be explained as sensory inputs in the context of a self. Would I be right in thinking you don't believe my example computer is conscious? And would it help you understand my position if I said I think my computer might be conscious in a very primitive way?
tluyben2 7y ago
I think the same thing; people are overthinking this maybe because somehow we need to be special (in the absence of aliens). Interesting article though; we won’t know until we understand/recreate it and if we never do, we won’t know.
sebastianconcpt 7y ago
You are not alone but is a gross oversimplification that of course doesn't explain a LOT of phenomenon. Check this 9min David Chalmers interview about it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NK1Yo6VbRoo&feature=emb_title https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NK1Yo6VbRoo&feature=emb_titl...
criddell 7y ago
> If I'm correct, then an illusion of consciousness makes complete evolutionary sense. If you are correct, then actual consciousness would make sense as well, wouldn't it?
PaulDavisThe1st 7y ago
Sorry, but this barely scratches the surface. The key problem of consciousness is not what we have an experience of (eg. "you're a real thing that thinks and feels"). It's the fact that it is possible to have any experience at all. Yes, it seems quite likely that a great deal of what we are conscious of is an "illusion" created in our brains, albeit some rather handy illusions. But that doesn't get even one step closer to the core philosophical problem of how we (or anything else) is able to experience anything at all (including the illusion of being a real thing that thinks and feels)
- mapcars 7y ago
  >core philosophical problem of how we (or anything else) is able to experience anything at all By `how` you mean the mechanics of it or something else?
  - chmod775 7y ago
    > By `how` you mean the mechanics of it or something else? He means something else, but human language really has a problem of expressing this. I'd say he means what remains to be explained once you have explained the mechanical how. To where or what or who are the experiences relaid? What is it? Also known as the question of "what the hell is I".
  - mooseburger 7y ago
    Both the brain and a chair are made of the same fundamental particles, following the same physics. Yet, no one believes the chair experiences anything. The core problem of the materialist frame is why the atoms that make up the brain are able to experience anything.
- kypro 7y ago
  You don't have an experience. You might think you do, but I see no scientific reason to believe you. What you might have is an algorithm in your brain telling you that there is a self experiencing the world. But in reality you're just a collection of sub atomic particles. Edit: Why should I take your claim of conscious experience any more seriously than my computer's who's screen is currently reading: "I AM CONSCIOUS" from a notepad? Is the only difference that I told the computer to say it, where as you are told by your genetics to say and think it?
Vysero 7y ago
It's not a lie lol our pain and the pain of others is important and worth caring about. If it's not, then what is? Nothing.. so far as I can see. If that's a lie then you're going to have to define what it means to lie before I would acknowledge a lie is any different from the truth.
normalnorm 7y ago
The position you describe is known as "eliminative materialism": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism I find this position absurd for the following reason: > The illusion of consciousness is obviously beneficial. Yes, but who experiences this illusion? This explanation begs the question.
adwn 7y ago
You seem to be misunderstanding the question of consciousness. It's not about how you observe others to appear conscious, but about how you yourself observe your own consciousness. > It's a lie our brain tells us [...] Who is "us"? Or, to be more precise, if your brain tells you that you're experiencing pain, than what is "you", and what is "experiencing"? That's the question of consciousness. This is not something we know how to observe and judge in others, you can only observe it in yourself (and draw conclusions about other people by analogy, i.e., due to similarity between our physical brain structures). For example, is the following Python script print("I am conscious.") any more conscious than this one? print("I am not conscious.") You'll probably say that they're both not conscious, although there is no hard evidence either way. And that's because we don't know how to reliably observe consciousness.
- mapcars 7y ago
  >you can only observe it in yourself I don't think you can really observe it either. I doesn't look like I can name any property of "it", I can only be aware of "it".
  - marcAKAmarc 7y ago
    I think you can definitely observe it in yourself. Try this (copy and pasting from a separate response I made): Think about experiencing pain and what it feels like to you. Really try to simulate it in your thoughts. Probably sucks. Now think about happiness and what that feels like to you. Probably doesn't suck as much. Without watching a scan of your brain, and without collecting any sort of quantifiable data about your nervous system, you were most likely able to recall those two feelings and (much more importantly) discern the difference between those two feelings just now. You didn't do this by any type of measurement of quantity, just by quality of experience (qualia). If you were able to identify and discern the separate feelings you have internally assigned to happiness and pain without quantifying them, I would call that proof of consciousness within yourself maybe.
- kypro 7y ago
  > You seem to be misunderstanding the question of consciousness. It's not about how you observe others to appear conscious, but about how you yourself observe your own consciousness. Well yeah, I experience something which I understand to be a conscious experience, but I don't think it's real. I accept there is an experience of consciousness, but I don't see any reason to believe it is real even though I think I experience it. > Who is "us"? Or, to be more precise, if your brain tells you that you're experiencing pain, than what is "you", and what is "experiencing"? That's the question of consciousness. I think my brain is sensing pain and telling me to perceive the pain in the context of "self". I've never understood why some people don't think this logically consistent honestly. It seems like the only possible explanation unless you start assuming consciousness is a metaphysical, almost magical thing. > You'll probably say that they're both not conscious, although there is no hard evidence either way. And that's because we don't know how to reliably observe consciousness. This isn't a good argument. There's no hard evidence that there isn't an invisible elephant sat next to you right now. I don't understand why you are even assuming that there might be something such as consciousness? There is literally no objective physical evidence for it, where as there is mass amounts of data to show neurologically it's probably an illusion. Really all I am saying is that I don't think we should believe our minds when they tell us our experiences are important because we are so bias, and there are clear evolutionary incentives for us to think that way.
Gatsky 7y ago
Well I think the tricky thing about consciousness is that it can’t be an illusion. There is no doubt that you and I have the subjective experience of consciousness. Whether it is an illusion or not doesn’t really matter, you are just making a judgement about the legitimacy of the process which leads to consciousness. I think what you are getting at is the zombie concept. This is where we construct a being which has sensory inputs and actions, and behaves like a human, but isn’t actually conscious. Distinguishing zombies from real consciousness is supposed to highlight the difficulty in detecting or measuring consciousness. But, by definition the zombie doesn’t have any subjective experience. As soon as you introduce that, you are really saying the zombie is conscious. As for using consciousness to decide if suffering has moral significance, well yeah that is an interesting idea. One concern is that if we can’t understand or detect consciousness, then we may create conscious artificial life which experiences unimaginable suffering, without even realising it. I don’t think we can say that the experiences of an AI will always lack moral significance.
- SubiculumCode 7y ago
  What a strange concept: My Ryzen AMD CPU is maybe experiencing suffering.
- kypro 7y ago
  > Well I think the tricky thing about consciousness is that it can’t be an illusion. There is no doubt that you and I have the subjective experience of consciousness. Whether it is an illusion or not doesn’t really matter, you are just making a judgement about the legitimacy of the process which leads to consciousness. I'm not sure if you're implying I do or not, but to clarify, I don't deny there is something we believe to be an experience of consciousness. I just don't believe it is any more real than a computer, or to use your example, a zombie claiming consciousness. > I think what you are getting at is the zombie concept. This is where we construct a being which has sensory inputs and actions, and behaves like a human, but isn’t actually conscious. Distinguishing zombies from real consciousness is supposed to highlight the difficulty in detecting or measuring consciousness. But, by definition the zombie doesn’t have any subjective experience. As soon as you introduce that, you are really saying the zombie is conscious. Yes, I think we are "zombies" who truly believe from their programming that they are human with a conscious experience of their selfs. I think this belief is evolutionarily important because it might be the only thing that stops pain being morally irrelevant. Or at the very least, it makes us believe the pain of a conscious entity is worth considering.
deleted 7y ago
[deleted]
dcre 7y ago
How can an illusory consciousness be conscious of the illusion of consciousness?
- kanzenryu2 7y ago
  Via some mechanism we don't yet understand.

by kypro 7y ago

danharaj 7y ago

How do you define an illusion without first positing a being that can experience (hence conscious) an illusion? What does it mean that consciousness is a 'lie our brain tells us', who are we? Are you assuming some form of cartesian dualism, or perhaps you are making a sort of homunculus argument? [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument

sebastianconcpt 7y ago
Right, the illusion hypothesis isn't consistent and also can't explain Qualia.
kypro 7y ago
By illusion I just mean there isn't really a physical pain (sub atomic elements don't feel pain) but our brains still act as if we experience pain from the perspective of a self. From this perspective the self is a real thing, you are a conscious human, not a collection of atoms - you matter more than your matter. Let me try this another way... Imagine an identical universe with one difference - no one is conscious. If I decide to kill in this hypothetical universe is it wrong? And even if you say yes, is it equally as wrong as in a universe with conscious beings? This is the explanation for consciousness and why the illusion is important. We think we're aware of our senses and in control of our actions, but we know we're not. We know what we consciously obverse is different from the input we get from our sensory organs - which is the reason things like optical illusions exist. We also know that we subconsciously make our decisions a fraction of second before we're consciously aware of them. In my opinion this all points towards consciousness being an illusion, rather than an actual awareness of self.
- SamBam 7y ago
  > but our brains still act as if we experience pain That's fine for someone else's brain -- I can see it act as if a person is experiencing pain -- but I know that I experience pain. I'm not just going through the motions, I experience it. Again, your argument is a homunculus argument -- that your brain is lying/whatever for the benefit of something else inside that is experiencing the "illusion" of consciousness. Again, you can't have an illusion of consciousness, because an "illusion" requires consciousness.
  - kypro 7y ago
    > I know that I experience pain I accept you perceive pain in the context of a self. > you can't have an illusion of consciousness, because an "illusion" requires consciousness. I think this might be the core of our disagreement. I don't know why you think that? An illusion is just a false perception of reality so it doesn't technically require consciousness - but I think I know what you're getting at. Imagine a computer which can "see" its surroundings through a camera. Why couldn't I program this computer to think it's conscious and to experience its visual data in the context of a self? That's what I honestly think we're doing and what you're describing when you talk about consciousness. I don't know why the experience you're calling consciousness can't just be explained more easily by your brain processing sensory inputs in the context of a self. I understand to you this feels like a special thing, but from a physical perspective I honestly don't know what you're describing that couldn't be explained as sensory inputs in the context of a self. Would I be right in thinking you don't believe my example computer is conscious? And would it help you understand my position if I said I think my computer might be conscious in a very primitive way?

tluyben2 7y ago

I think the same thing; people are overthinking this maybe because somehow we need to be special (in the absence of aliens). Interesting article though; we won’t know until we understand/recreate it and if we never do, we won’t know.

sebastianconcpt 7y ago

You are not alone but is a gross oversimplification that of course doesn't explain a LOT of phenomenon. Check this 9min David Chalmers interview about it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NK1Yo6VbRoo&feature=emb_title https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NK1Yo6VbRoo&feature=emb_titl...

criddell 7y ago

> If I'm correct, then an illusion of consciousness makes complete evolutionary sense. If you are correct, then actual consciousness would make sense as well, wouldn't it?

PaulDavisThe1st 7y ago

Sorry, but this barely scratches the surface. The key problem of consciousness is not what we have an experience of (eg. "you're a real thing that thinks and feels"). It's the fact that it is possible to have any experience at all. Yes, it seems quite likely that a great deal of what we are conscious of is an "illusion" created in our brains, albeit some rather handy illusions. But that doesn't get even one step closer to the core philosophical problem of how we (or anything else) is able to experience anything at all (including the illusion of being a real thing that thinks and feels)

mapcars 7y ago
>core philosophical problem of how we (or anything else) is able to experience anything at all By `how` you mean the mechanics of it or something else?
- chmod775 7y ago
  > By `how` you mean the mechanics of it or something else? He means something else, but human language really has a problem of expressing this. I'd say he means what remains to be explained once you have explained the mechanical how. To where or what or who are the experiences relaid? What is it? Also known as the question of "what the hell is I".
- mooseburger 7y ago
  Both the brain and a chair are made of the same fundamental particles, following the same physics. Yet, no one believes the chair experiences anything. The core problem of the materialist frame is why the atoms that make up the brain are able to experience anything.
kypro 7y ago
You don't have an experience. You might think you do, but I see no scientific reason to believe you. What you might have is an algorithm in your brain telling you that there is a self experiencing the world. But in reality you're just a collection of sub atomic particles. Edit: Why should I take your claim of conscious experience any more seriously than my computer's who's screen is currently reading: "I AM CONSCIOUS" from a notepad? Is the only difference that I told the computer to say it, where as you are told by your genetics to say and think it?

Vysero 7y ago

It's not a lie lol our pain and the pain of others is important and worth caring about. If it's not, then what is? Nothing.. so far as I can see. If that's a lie then you're going to have to define what it means to lie before I would acknowledge a lie is any different from the truth.

normalnorm 7y ago

The position you describe is known as "eliminative materialism": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism I find this position absurd for the following reason: > The illusion of consciousness is obviously beneficial. Yes, but who experiences this illusion? This explanation begs the question.

adwn 7y ago

You seem to be misunderstanding the question of consciousness. It's not about how you observe others to appear conscious, but about how you yourself observe your own consciousness. > It's a lie our brain tells us [...] Who is "us"? Or, to be more precise, if your brain tells you that you're experiencing pain, than what is "you", and what is "experiencing"? That's the question of consciousness. This is not something we know how to observe and judge in others, you can only observe it in yourself (and draw conclusions about other people by analogy, i.e., due to similarity between our physical brain structures). For example, is the following Python script print("I am conscious.") any more conscious than this one? print("I am not conscious.") You'll probably say that they're both not conscious, although there is no hard evidence either way. And that's because we don't know how to reliably observe consciousness.

mapcars 7y ago
>you can only observe it in yourself I don't think you can really observe it either. I doesn't look like I can name any property of "it", I can only be aware of "it".
- marcAKAmarc 7y ago
  I think you can definitely observe it in yourself. Try this (copy and pasting from a separate response I made): Think about experiencing pain and what it feels like to you. Really try to simulate it in your thoughts. Probably sucks. Now think about happiness and what that feels like to you. Probably doesn't suck as much. Without watching a scan of your brain, and without collecting any sort of quantifiable data about your nervous system, you were most likely able to recall those two feelings and (much more importantly) discern the difference between those two feelings just now. You didn't do this by any type of measurement of quantity, just by quality of experience (qualia). If you were able to identify and discern the separate feelings you have internally assigned to happiness and pain without quantifying them, I would call that proof of consciousness within yourself maybe.
kypro 7y ago
> You seem to be misunderstanding the question of consciousness. It's not about how you observe others to appear conscious, but about how you yourself observe your own consciousness. Well yeah, I experience something which I understand to be a conscious experience, but I don't think it's real. I accept there is an experience of consciousness, but I don't see any reason to believe it is real even though I think I experience it. > Who is "us"? Or, to be more precise, if your brain tells you that you're experiencing pain, than what is "you", and what is "experiencing"? That's the question of consciousness. I think my brain is sensing pain and telling me to perceive the pain in the context of "self". I've never understood why some people don't think this logically consistent honestly. It seems like the only possible explanation unless you start assuming consciousness is a metaphysical, almost magical thing. > You'll probably say that they're both not conscious, although there is no hard evidence either way. And that's because we don't know how to reliably observe consciousness. This isn't a good argument. There's no hard evidence that there isn't an invisible elephant sat next to you right now. I don't understand why you are even assuming that there might be something such as consciousness? There is literally no objective physical evidence for it, where as there is mass amounts of data to show neurologically it's probably an illusion. Really all I am saying is that I don't think we should believe our minds when they tell us our experiences are important because we are so bias, and there are clear evolutionary incentives for us to think that way.

Gatsky 7y ago

Well I think the tricky thing about consciousness is that it can’t be an illusion. There is no doubt that you and I have the subjective experience of consciousness. Whether it is an illusion or not doesn’t really matter, you are just making a judgement about the legitimacy of the process which leads to consciousness. I think what you are getting at is the zombie concept. This is where we construct a being which has sensory inputs and actions, and behaves like a human, but isn’t actually conscious. Distinguishing zombies from real consciousness is supposed to highlight the difficulty in detecting or measuring consciousness. But, by definition the zombie doesn’t have any subjective experience. As soon as you introduce that, you are really saying the zombie is conscious. As for using consciousness to decide if suffering has moral significance, well yeah that is an interesting idea. One concern is that if we can’t understand or detect consciousness, then we may create conscious artificial life which experiences unimaginable suffering, without even realising it. I don’t think we can say that the experiences of an AI will always lack moral significance.

SubiculumCode 7y ago
What a strange concept: My Ryzen AMD CPU is maybe experiencing suffering.
kypro 7y ago
> Well I think the tricky thing about consciousness is that it can’t be an illusion. There is no doubt that you and I have the subjective experience of consciousness. Whether it is an illusion or not doesn’t really matter, you are just making a judgement about the legitimacy of the process which leads to consciousness. I'm not sure if you're implying I do or not, but to clarify, I don't deny there is something we believe to be an experience of consciousness. I just don't believe it is any more real than a computer, or to use your example, a zombie claiming consciousness. > I think what you are getting at is the zombie concept. This is where we construct a being which has sensory inputs and actions, and behaves like a human, but isn’t actually conscious. Distinguishing zombies from real consciousness is supposed to highlight the difficulty in detecting or measuring consciousness. But, by definition the zombie doesn’t have any subjective experience. As soon as you introduce that, you are really saying the zombie is conscious. Yes, I think we are "zombies" who truly believe from their programming that they are human with a conscious experience of their selfs. I think this belief is evolutionarily important because it might be the only thing that stops pain being morally irrelevant. Or at the very least, it makes us believe the pain of a conscious entity is worth considering.

deleted 7y ago

[deleted]

dcre 7y ago

How can an illusory consciousness be conscious of the illusion of consciousness?

kanzenryu2 7y ago
Via some mechanism we don't yet understand.