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The normal failure scenario for safety critical electronics on an aircraft is that you have an entirely redundant system that takes over. I don't see why that a
by YawningAngel 7y ago
The normal failure scenario for safety critical electronics on an aircraft is that you have an entirely redundant system that takes over. I don't see why that approach wouldn't have been sufficient here.
- acqq 7y agoIt is documented in the articles: failure modes have to be trained if they aren’t the same, and with MCAS as it should be (not as if was and failed catastrophically twice) they can’t be the same. New devices have to be recertified. Two sensors can’t be redundant, three would be again not the same plane. Newer computers won’t be the same plane etc. Wait to see what the final opinion of European agencies are once the latest changes are evaluated and you’ll see that it’s not the same plane, even if Boeing all the time bent over backwards over the dead bodies of others.