4 ms·
A lot of what you say is irrelevant. I get the feeling you aren't aware of the hard problem of consciousness, so I'll leave this here for you to read up on: htt
by aldoushuxley001 7y ago
A lot of what you say is irrelevant. I get the feeling you aren't aware of the hard problem of consciousness, so I'll leave this here for you to read up on: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness. Are you familiar with concepts like qualia? I recommend reading that wiki too.
The problem for you is that you still fail to draw a distinction between 2 highly correlated phenomena: the chemical cascade & the perception of red. You even get close to admitting the distinction yourself. E.g.:
> People who have the chemical cascade experience red. People who don't, don't--even if red light is there (i.e. if they are colorblind). Do you have any reason for believing these are different phenomena?
So yes, many reasons - some of which have already been explained and inadequately responded to, but here's another example that should prove it to you: We can put someone under anesthesia, shine red light into their eyes & they will still have the chemical cascade, but will not experience or perceive red. How do you square this circle? I suspect you'll insist they must also experience it and simply not know, but I'll be interested in hearing your mental gymnastics.
> It's also in the brain, because the mind is just the brain.
> This isn't hypothetical. We can read (very) fuzzy images from people's brains using neural-imaging[2]. I'm not aware of any experiments that specifically has read a red triangle, but I don't see any reason to believe that this image is uniquely in the mind and not the brain.
I've looked at brains under the microscope... never once have I seen a red triangle, or green square, or blue circle, yet here they are in my mind. Again your confusing correlation for the thing itself.
Yes I'm sure we'll get to the point where if I imagine a red triangle, then we'll be able to "read" it from my brain, but this doesn't mean that the red triangle is in my brain, just that a certain activity of neurons in the brain is correlated with a red triangle... those neural imaging techniques are all largely about correlation, which is my point exactly.
> If it's qualitatively different, what are the qualitative differences?
The brain is made of traditional matter we're familiar with (e.g. atoms and their constituent parts, amongst others), but the mind is made up of things like sense-perceptions (e.g. the colour red or the smell of lemons, which are fundamentally irreducible - by which I mean you cannot say the perception of a red triangle is made up of traditional matter. Instead a red triangle is simply made up of red; in essence, if a red triangle is made up of atoms, those atoms would have the quality red, which is a property traditional matter does not possess, hence the mind being made up of qualitatively different matter than the brain.
I know it's probably hard for someone who refuses to believe consciousness exists to admit that consciousness does in fact exist as a separate distinct phenomenon, so I won't try too hard to convince you. I'm sure with time you'll make that distinction too.
- kerkeslager 7y ago> I get the feeling you aren't aware of the hard problem of consciousness, so I'll leave this here for you to read up on: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness. Are you familiar with concepts like qualia? I recommend reading that wiki too. This is, again, saying a problem is hard, and then concluding that since we can't solve it, the solution is mind! Which again remains a premature conclusion. > The problem for you is that you still fail to draw a distinction between 2 highly correlated phenomena: the chemical cascade & the perception of red. No, that's not a failure. That's my entire point. There aren't two phenomena: they are the same thing. > We can put someone under anesthesia, shine red light into their eyes & they will still have the chemical cascade, but will not experience or perceive red. How do you square this circle? Surely you can see how inserting a chemical into the brain might change or interfere with the chemical cascade? If you assume that the chemical cascade IS the perception of red, then interfering with the chemical cascade preventing the perception of red makes perfect sense. > I've looked at brains under the microscope... never once have I seen a red triangle, or green square, or blue circle, yet here they are in my mind. Again your confusing correlation for the thing itself. I must admit I got a chuckle out of this. Is this what you think I'm claiming? This is definitely not what I'm claiming. I'm just going to quote this so you can't retract it. > those neural imaging techniques are all largely about correlation, which is my point exactly. Neural imaging is done with physical machines, which can only detect physical phenomena. "Correlating" means to take two things and show them to be related. So if you're correlating two phenomenon with machinery that can only detect physical phenomena, you can only correlate physical phenomena. If you're claiming that neural imaging shows the correlation between a chemical cascade and the processes of the mind, then the processes of the mind must be a physical phenomenon--which is my point. > I know it's probably hard for someone who refuses to believe consciousness exists to admit that consciousness does in fact exist as a separate distinct phenomenon, so I won't try too hard to convince you. I don't refuse to believe in consciousness--consciousness certainly exists, as electrical and chemical processes in the brain. And I wouldn't refuse to believe in consciousness as distinct from electrical and chemical reactions in the brain, if you presented any evidence for that assertion, instead of just repeating it and adding new unfounded claims. > I'm sure with time you'll make that distinction too. You are sure of a great many things.