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This is why I consider address space randomization to be a cosmetic fix that doesn't solve the real problem - a memory safety violation - but gives an excuse fo
by Animats 7y ago
This is why I consider address space randomization to be a cosmetic fix that doesn't solve the real problem - a memory safety violation - but gives an excuse for not fixing the real problem.
It just increases the cost of the attack development beyond script-kiddie level. Most of today's attackers seem to be competent and well-funded, either by nation-states, organized crime, or the advertising industry.
- saagarjha 7y agoASLR isn’t a complete exploit mitigation technique, it just hinders attacker by usually requiring them to pair it with another exploit. On many platforms the limited number of random bits makes it clear that it’s not a perfect protection against all attacks.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- advisedwang 7y agoThat's like saying you don't like crash barriers on the side of a highway because it doesn't address the real problem of cars crashing. Yes, ASLR doesn't address the root bugs. Yes, ASLR can be bypassed. But it still lowers the overall risk and so is worth having around.
- Animats 7y agoNo, it's not. Crash barriers are a defense against random events. Attackers are non-random and purposeful. Several defensive layers, all with holes, only protect against inept attackers.
- satya71 7y agoI suspect the number of inept attackers is rather high.
- BoorishBears 7y agoYou're making their point. You're saying it protects against "inept" attackers, that lowers risk. No need to nitpick a simple analogy.
- DaniloDias 7y agoHis comment is a textbook example of the kind of nihilistic antagonism so common in the security industry.
- Skunkleton 7y agoThere can be only one response to these people. Stop using computers. Computers are hugely complex, and no amount of software level shenanigans can amount to anything other than a crash barrier.
- yjftsjthsd-h 7y ago> nihilistic antagonism so common in the security industry Thank you, that is a very nice label for an annoying phenomenon.
- pertymcpert 7y agoGreat. So it does actually help.
- inetknght 7y agoLearn what "defense in depth" means.
- _wldu 7y agoI agree. This is why rust and go don't need it. Address space randomization is an attempt by the OS to workaround language problems (specifically C). Nothing against C, I love it, but people really need to move away from it where possible.
- HorstG 7y agoRust and Go both can have C-based libs linked to their address space thus exposing them to the same problems ASLR diminishes (I accidentially wrote "solves" here. ASLR solves nothing, it just makes exploits harder. It's a holey raincoat...). Also, both language runtimes and compilers might have flaws. "don't need" is dangerous hybris imho, of the same kind that was the downfall of Java security. Lots of Java exploits were actually just broken linked versions of libjpeg and others. No single measure will ever be sufficient, one should never become complacent like that...
- saagarjha 7y agoSince at least Rust depends on the system C library, it gets ASLR whether it needs it or not.
- pjmlp 7y agoPlenty of languages don't need it, even some older than C. This all comes down to C designers ignoring the security best practices of other systems programming languages, and UNIX clones having mainstream adoption. Morris worm (1988) wouldn't have been possible in regular Modula-2 (1978) code, nor Ada (1983), Mesa (1976), ESPOL/NEWP (1961), PL/I (1964), PL/S (1974), BLISS (1970), just citing a couple of them. Yet C17 still doesn't provide language features to prevent another Morris worm, and the security Annex was made optional instead.
- roddux 7y ago>ignoring the security best practices of other systems programming languages Can you please expand on this point?
- 7y ago
- jnwatson 7y agoNo, most of today’s attackers are not competent or well-funded, but you don’t hear about them because they’re not news. ASLR changes the game in that instead of a control flow vulnerability needing to be found, you also need an info leak and the ability to put that into the exploit. That’s a nontrivial improvement.
- rkangel 7y ago> Most of today's attackers seem to be competent and well-funded By volume no. There are enormous numbers of low-level and mid-level hackers out there working for any number of interests. You have to be a pretty elite level of organised crime before your attacks reach the level achieved by nation states. Security design is to some extent a cost tradeoff - the more you spend on security the more the attackers are going to have to spend on attacking you. If you're dealing with insensitive data, and are only going to be of interest to script kiddies, then you can spend only a little. If you're a widely deployed device, and people use it to store sensitive data that might be of interest to nation states, then you have to spend enormously more to mitigate against it. Layered security or "defence in depth" is how anyone in the field will tell you to design secure devices these days. ASLR doesn't do anything on its own, it just amplifies the cost of any other attack, as does other mitigations like W^X. No layer is ever 100% secure in the real world. But 5 layers that are 99.9% secure make for a difficult to attack system.